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Abstract 
Contending for the Private Sphere in a Guangzhou Community 
Submitted by YEUNG Hoi Shan 
For the degree of Master of Sociology 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
In order to illuminate the cultural foundation of civil society of China, this study attempts to 
explore whether Guangzhou residents are conscious of defending their personal autonomy 
when the state intrudes into the private sphere. Through observing a Resident Committee in 
Guangzhou, which is a state apparatus in the grass roots of Chinese cities, private domains 
where the state and individuals contend for control are identified. It is found that the residents 
had the strongest resistance to the state intrusion into the private domains related to the 
property right. In order to achieve a sustaining civil society, it is essential to foster a culture in 
which people value the individual right and liberty. Residents' resistance against the state 
manifests that cultural foundation of civil society emerges from private domains related to the 
property right. However, the residents did not perceive they had inalienable right in the 
private domains of the body and the personal information. Their self-consciousness needs to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
Numerous studies of civil society of China focus on its structural dimension, trying to find 
out the degree of autonomy from state control enjoyed by intermediate associations in the 
c o u n t r y � I n contrast, the cultural dimension of civil society has gained far less attention. 
This imbalance can be explained with the history of civil society study in the past two 
decades. After a century of neglect, interest in civil society revived entirely following the 
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. One example showing 
the value of civil society was Poland, where Solidarity and the Catholic Church offered 
institutional forms of association for social movements directed against the state's monopoly 
of political activity. In the context of Eastern Europe, civil society was thought to be 
anti-state in nature and to aim at fighting for freedom from the former Soviet Union. The 
Tiananmen Square Movement in 1989, which once lit up a hope for democracy in 
Communist China, was brutally suppressed eventually. Inspired by the democratic 
oppositions in Eastern Europe, scholars attributed the failure of the Movement to the 
weakness of civil society. Since then, intellectuals have been enthusiastic about searching for 
the potential for civil society of China. 
However, efforts have been mainly devoted to exploring the structural elements of civil 
society, i.e. different forms of association independent of the state. It is hoped that 
intermediate associations will serve as the key to democratization of the socialist regime. As 
Chamberlain points out, such research approach reflects a flawed conception of civil society 
1 For examples, Gordon (1996), Howell (1998), B.Y Sun (1994), Unger (1996),linger and Chan (1995). 
2 "The goal is not to take over the state but to unhinge social structure from the state structure and to define a 
separate public sphere of pluralistic associations hitherto monopolized by the state" Yang 1989, pp.37. 
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“insofar as they define it exclusively in terms of 'counterstructure'一as 'existing outside the 
orbit to the state,' 'beyond the control of government,' 'autonomous vis-a-vis state,' so forth. 
The underlying premise seems to be that the existence and viability of civil society vary 
directly with the distance (or the absence) of state power." (1993: 205). 
Though essential, existence of intermediate associations alone is insufficient to support a 
well-functioning civil society. In what cultural context those associations are embedded 
should be considered carefully. Reviewing the historical development of civil society in 
Western Europe, Hefner (1998) points out that even as late as the 20 century when societal 
self-organization was well institutionalized by civil associations, the social capital was not 
sufficient to stabilize European politics into an enduring pattern of freedom, tolerance, and 
social participation. Civil society was far from perfection: persecution of the Jews, bloodshed 
between Protestants and Catholics, the century class conflict and the century's wars 
of nation and race. 
Hefner (1998) concludes an important lesson from this European experience. He suggests, 
“The dispersion of powers and the balancing of forces associated with self-organizations do 
indeed provide important supports for civility and participation. Left to themselves, however, 
these structural conditions often create no more than segmentary freedoms, enjoyed by only a 
portion of the populace. The broader achievement of citizen equally requires at least two 
other things: the scaling up of civic values into a certain kind of state, and a broadly based 
civic culture. Though deeply dependent on it, these two influences are not reducible to 
societal self-organization, but have a political and sociological integrity quite their own" 
(1998). 
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Therefore, civilities are highly emphasized in civil society discussions. Hall (1998: 56-59) 
stresses that "genealogies of civility" should refer to a culture of pluralism. When society is 
autonomous from the state, individuals may still be suppressed if they are bound to social ties 
like kinship. Membership of social groups must be voluntary and overlapping, for it is in the 
complex interstices of social life that individuality often resides. His argument is that civil 
society will be one in which difference is allowed, accepted and even encouraged. Varied 
attitudes can be involved here. Ginger (1995: 305) also suggests that a wide range of beliefs, 
conceptions and attitudes should coexist freely and be equally fostered by their proponents in 
civil society. 
Shils (1991) highlights the importance of tolerance to civil society. He warns that civil 
society may degenerate into "a war of each against all" (1991:15) if people pursue diversity 
without tolerance. It may become a site of intense conflicts between irreconcilable interests 
and ideas espoused by uncompromising parochial groups and inflexibly egoistic individuals. 
Shils suggests (1991: 12-15) that tolerance can help people to hold anger and resentment in 
check, pacifying and calming sentiments. It makes opposition less irreconcilable and limits 
the intensity of conflict. Antagonists may reach compromises more possibly. This tolerant 
spirit can be established when people consider others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in 
their rights and obligations as members of civil society. 
In post-Mao China, a variety of social groups that are partially or even totally autonomous 
from the state has arisen. Inevitably, the growth of these social groups weakens the capacity 
of the state to control its population. To search for civil society, however, it concomitantly 
requires people to think about its cultural foundation. Many observers of civil society of 
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China have advocated this cultural research approach.^ Hence, this study aims at directing 
attention away from the structural elements of civil society of China to its cultural 
foundation. 
1.2 Research question and objectives 
The cultural foundation of civil society mainly comes from two political 
traditions一republicanism and liberalism. In republican tradition, civil society denotes the 
virtue of participation of citizens in public affairs. In liberalist tradition, civil society 
emphasizes individual rights and liberty. Therefore, though being a public domain which 
encourages collaboration among citizens, civil society should also allow individuation (Hall, 
1995: 25-27). Based on this normative belief, the private sphere is highly valued in civil 
society discourse. The private sphere is seen as the domain from which potential solidarity, 
equality and public participation can arise (Sheller & Urry，2003: 109-111). Its protection is 
regarded as one characteristic of a strong and sound civil society (Giner, 1995:307). 
Defending the private sphere means respect for the individual. In fact, the civilities of civil 
society mentioned above are consistent with this cultural assumption. While pluralism 
implies individuals are free to make their own choices, tolerance is needed to respect 
individuals with different opinions and interests. 
Civil society is indispensable to democracy because it can help to protect the individual rights 
and liberty of the individual against state suppression. However, civil society will be effective 
only when people value their individuality and perceive their personal autonomy as a right. 
Otherwise, people may not be conscious of defending themselves against oppression, and 
3 "The main problem with this approach is that it conflates the terms society and civil society. They are not the 
same. The qualifier 'civil' connotes, among other things, 'concern with the commonweal." Chamberlain 1993, 
pp. 204. "We have to find ways of assessing the qualities that contribute to a civil society capable of leading 
the way toward a democratic public sphere." Madsen 1993, pp. 190. 
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they may not have any intention to organize themselves to contend with the state. As 
Chandhoke reminds us, ‘‘The presence of civil society is a crucial, but not an adequate 
precondition for ensuring state accountability. Whether the state can be made accountable 
depends upon the self-consciousness, the vibrancy, and the political vision of civil society. An 
inactive civil society leads to unresponsive states; a politically self-conscious civil society 
imposes limits upon state power" (1995: 10). 
The Party-state of China has withdrawn much of its power from the private sphere after 
economic reforms. People now enjoy more freedom when compared with Mao era. 
Nonetheless, personal autonomy is not fully guaranteed. The one-child policy and arrests of 
religiously heterodox individuals are the best examples to illustrate the ability of the state to 
intrude into the most private areas of personal life. To find out how people perceive the 
private sphere, how they interpret state intrusion, and whether they think it is their right to 
enjoy personal autonomy, may shed light on the potential for civil society of China. 
This study focuses on Guangzhou residents, trying to explore how they perceive the 
private sphere when facing intrusion of Residents' Committees {jumin weiyuanhui). 
Large Chinese cities contain three levels of formal administration: the city government {shi 
zhengfu), the district government (qu zhengfu) and the street office (jiedoa banshichu). Each 
street office oversees a number of Residents' Committees. Residents' Committees are defined 
by law as “base-level autonomous organizations of the masses" and they are not considered 
part of the government. However, most of their financial resources come from the 
government. They actually constitute an extension of the municipal government's 
administrative apparatus at the grass roots of cities. For example, the urban area of 
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Guangzhou consists of 10 districts, subdivided into 116 street offices. Only in Donghan 
District, there were totally 139 Residents' Committees headed by 10 street offices in 2002.4 
The basic purpose of Residents' Committees is to facilitate government administrative and 
policing tasks, as well as providing a range of everyday services. For the sake of governance, 
different levels of government administration often order staff of Residents' Committees to 
intrude into private life of residents. For instance, the staff regularly visits married females to 
collect their personal information for the one-child policy. Thus, routines of Residents' 
Committees are illustrative of state intervention into the private sphere of the individual. 
It should be emphasized that this study is not interested in measuring the amount of 
autonomy enjoyed by Guangzhou residents from state control. Otherwise, it would be another 
'structural research'. Instead, its main theme is to delineate the subjective perceptions of 
residents. It aims at finding out whether residents perceive the private sphere being free 
from state intervention as their right and whether they are conscious of defending the 
private sphere. It hopes to explore the cultural foundation of civil society of China following 
the line of thought of liberalism, which highlights the value of individuality. 
1.3 Significance of the study 
Many researchers have made attempts to analyze the possibility of civil society of China from 
a 'structural' perspective. They are concerned with the relationship between intermediate 
organizations and the state. It has been found that the room for civil society is constrained as 
the state tightly controls the intermediary sphere by adopting a strict registration system for 
4 Guangzhoushi Dongshanqu minzhengju (2003). 
6 
self-organizing associations.^ This study may contribute to the discussion of civil society of 
China by providing an alternative perspective. As Lui and Chan emphasize (2001), civil 
society should be built upon a culture in which individuals value the personal autonomy as a 
right. People's orientations may in turn affect the cultural qualities of civil society: its 
self-consciousness, its vibrancy, and its political vision. These are the issues that have been 
neglected in the current discussion of civil society of China, and that cannot be tackled solely 
by a 'structural' approach. 
1.4 Outline of the study 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first part is literature review. It first discusses the 
definition of civil society as well as relation of the concept to democracy. Focus is put on 
public/private dichotomy in civil society discourse, showing the private sphere is significant 
to the cultural foundation of civil society. The boundary between 'public' and 'private' in 
both Mao and post-Mao China is discussed. It also reviews the roles and functions of 
Residents' Committees in the urban administration of China. 
The second part is methodology. This study adopts the qualitative method of observation. 
One Residents' Committee in Guangzhou was observed so as to find out how it intruded into 
private life of residents. Guangzhou residents were contacted to understand how they 
perceived the intrusion of Residents' Committees. 
In chapter 3, four government policies carried out by the observed Residents' Committee are 
illustrated. To execute these polices, staff of the Committee needed to, for example, inspect 
residents' apartments, collect their personal information and assist the government to take 
5 See Howell (1998: 62-64) for details of the registration system. 
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away their property. 
The residents' opinions about the four policies are presented in Chapter 4. This chapter is to 
demonstrate how residents felt when their private life was threatened by intrusion. 
Chapter 5 discusses the residents' perceptions of the private sphere. The four government 
polices involved four domains of the private sphere where contests between the state and the 
individual occurred. They included the domestic space, the property, the body and the 
personal information. The residents assigned different meanings to these domains and this in 
turn affected how they perceived the state intrusion. 
It is found that there were four different ways the Guangzhou residents perceived different 
domains of the private sphere. They tended to interpret the domestic space as an inalienable 
domain and the state intrusion into this domain was completely unacceptable. The property 
and the body were perceived as negotiable domains. The Residents believed whether state 
could interfere in these domains was subject to negotiation between the state and residents. 
The personal information was regarded as both uncontrollable domain and open domain of 
the private sphere. When the residents perceived the personal information as an 
uncontrollable domain, they tended to be submissive to state intrusion even though they 
wanted to protect informational privacy. They did not believe they had any rights to refuse 
intrusion. On some other occasions, they interpreted the personal information as an open 
domain. They uncritically accepted state intrusion and had little alertness to protect their 
privacy. 
Besides, it was noted that the residents were most defensive when the state sought to interfere 
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in private domains related to the property right. They perceived intrusion into domestic space 
as violation of home ownership. They were critical when the state took away their property in 
the name of public interest. This study suggests that the right to private property {siyou 
caichan quan), guaranteed by the law of China, provided residents a shield against the state 
intrusion. However, they did not perceive they had the right to defend the body and personal 
information against the state. 
Chapter 6 is conclusion of the study. It suggests that the residents' perceptions possess the 
elements essential to the cultural foundation of civil society. As the residents were concerned 
with personal autonomy enjoyed in private domains related to the property right, they 
contended with the state for their right. However, the residents' sense of personal autonomy 
was still limited. They were not conscious of defending the private domains of body and 
personal information. Their self-consciousness needs to develop further for a stronger cultural 
foundation of civil society of China. 
9 
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Methodology 
Although civil society is the public domain in which citizens collaborate for common good, 
the importance of the private sphere to its cultural foundation should not be overlooked. In 
the following discussion, the relationship between civil society and the private sphere is 
demonstrated. 
2.1 Civil society and democracy 
The concept of civil society founded upon theoretical separation between state and society 
emerged between the and centuries in Western Europe. After a century of neglect, 
interest in civil society has fully revived since 1980s. Origins of this revival are political. The 
central theme of modem civil society argument advocates the self-management of a social 
sphere to resist the ‘overreach，of the state. The focus on this sphere has been a reaction to 
totalitarian regime in Eastern Europe. For example, the success of democratic movement in 
Poland is attributed to the presence of civil society, which has provided a social space for 
voluntary associational activities to contend with the oppressive state (Kean, 1998: 2-7). 
However, there is no consensus on the boundary of this self-managing sphere. Opinions 
about what institutional elements civil society should include are divergent, too7 In order to 
avoid confusion, some theorists suggest that civil society can be equated with voluntary 
organizations. As Eberly suggests, "Although civil society is often used as an adjective to 
describe many things people want, it is best understood as a noun—as a real flesh and blood 
'thing'—a social realm, consisting of a range of actual institutions with moral substance and 
6 See He (1998). He reviews western discussions on civil society, showing the complexity of the concept. He 
suggests that opinions about the boundary of civil society can be grouped into two major streams. The first 
stream is based on an assumption of state-society dichotomy, defining it as social and economic spheres 
outside state control. The second stream grounds the concept in an assumption of state-economy-civil society 
trichotomy. Civil society is thought to be a partially autonomous realm mediating between society and the 
state, while market should not be included in it. 
7 Ibid. Market, family and even class are examples that have been suggested by different theorists. 
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function. Above all, civil society denotes that sector of society in which nonpolitical 
institutions operate一families, houses of worship, neighborhoods, civic groups, and just about 
every form of voluntary associations imaginable" (2000: 7). 
Lui and Chan (2001: 371) also define the concept in a narrow sense that civil society is 
mainly composed of voluntary organizations, but unlike Eberly, they explain clearly how they 
draw the boundary of civil society. They suggest that civil society is situated between family 
and political society while excluding market. On one hand, they think civil society should not 
embrace the private sphere of family in order to avoid reducing the concept to 'society'. On 
the other hand, following Cohen and Arato (1995: viii-xi), they believe that civil society 
should be differentiated from both market and political society. As market has already 
developed its own autonomous logics, whether it can handle issues like social justice or 
social solidarity is doubtful. Political society, consisting of political parties and other political 
organizations, may not fulfill the quest for open-ended communication and normative 
integration because actors of political society are involved with state power which they seek 
to control and manage. 
Lui and Chan define civil society as "the autonomous, pluralistic and open public sphere 
composed of intermediate organizations" (2001:372). They refer "the public sphere" to a 
social realm in which citizens associate, communicate and organize collective actions 
concerning public good. These intermediate organizations may include professional groups, 
labor unions, chambers of commerce, pressure groups, religious organizations, interest clubs, 
etc. They help to integrate private interest into collective or public interest, mediating 
between the 'private' and the 'public'. To be qualified as a component of civil society, an 
intermediate organization should be autonomous with their organizational and financial 
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decisions without being controlled by the state or corporations. They should also be open and 
pluralistic in a sense that membership is based on free choice and overlapping membership 
among different organizations is allowed (Lui & Chan, 2001: 372). 
It is now widely accepted that civil society provides a necessary ingredient for a healthy 
democracy. Protecting individuals against the state and promoting participation of citizens 
in public affairs are two major contributions of civil society to democracy. In different 
political contexts, these two contributions are differently emphasized. 
In the democratic movements of Eastern Europe in 1980s, safeguarding the individual liberty 
against totalitarian regimes was the focus of civil society discourse. This role of civil society 
is derived from the political tradition of liberalism in the and centuries, which 
stresses the rationality and moral authority of the individual. In this tradition, it is stressed the 
state is only a necessary evil to facilitate people's pursuit of their self-defined goals and its 
power should be limited. Thus, mission of civil society is to protect autonomy of social life, 
object state oppression and reject over-expansion of state functions. When the self-managing 
sphere of civil society is armed with rights, freedom and citizenship, it can become the site 
for producing a critical rational discourse to interrogate the state. The state cannot 
monopolize political discourse or seek to limit the practices of society in whatever ways it 
wants (Chandhoke, 1995: 9). 
In the U.S. civil society debate, many theorists emphasize the virtue of participation in 
response to concern about defects of individualism. It is worried that individuals unlimitedly 
expanding their own interests will cause damaging effects to civil society (Elberly, 
2000:10-11). This leads to the revival of republican tradition in civil society discussion. The 
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tradition of republicanism can be traced back to the thoughts of Aristotle, Machiavelli and 
Tocqueville. Republican tradition stresses individuals realize themselves through 
participation in political activities. Since the individual liberty can only be guaranteed in a 
self-ruling republic, people should consider citizenship as responsibility. Arendt (1995) 
suggests that civil society provides a platform for citizens to debate about public interest and 
they can leam about pluralistic viewpoints in this process. Putnam (1993) advocates that civic 
culture of trust and tolerance can be nurtured when members of a civic community 
collaborate on public matters on a reciprocal basis. 
2.2 Civil society and public/ private dichotomy 
Public/private dichotomy is a basic issue in civil society discourse. Although civil society is 
the public domain, it is normatively inseparable from the private sphere in Western political 
thought. It is believed that the private sphere should be defended as a basic value, which is 
necessary for the cultural foundation of civil society. 
The two categories of ‘public’ and 'private' are so complex and ambiguous that different 
people who employ these concepts place varied interpretations on them. Weintraub (1997) 
has identified four broad frameworks in which different notions of 'public' and 'private' play 
an important role.^ Two of them are illuminating in civil society discussion. 
In the first framework of liberal-economistic model, the public/private distinction primarily 
refers to the distinction between state administration and the market economy (Weintraub, 
8 The four frameworks include: (1) the liberal-economistic model, which sees the public/private distinction 
primarily in terms of the distinction between the state and the economy; (2) the civil republican tradition, 
which sees the public realm in terms of political community and citizenship, analytically distinct from both 
the market and the state; (3) the approach of cultural and social historians, which sees the public realm as a 
sphere of fluid sociability, distinct from both the structures of social organization and the private domains of 
intimacy and domesticity; and (4) those trends in feminism that conceives of the distinction between private 
and public in terms of the distinction between family and the larger economic and political order. 
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1997: 8). This framework is based on the assumptions of utilitarian liberalism that, what exist 
in society are individuals pursuing their self-interest, voluntary and contractual relations 
between individuals, and the state. The distinction between public and private—between the 
‘public sector' and the ‘private sector'—usually means the distinction between 
‘governmental, and the ‘nongovernmental,，with the implication that it should be as clearly 
dichotomous as possible. The field of the nongovernmental is conceived essentially in terms 
of the market. Therefore, this framework has been preoccupied with questions of jurisdiction, 
especially how to demarcate the sphere of the ‘public’ authority of the state from the sphere 
of formally voluntary relations between 'private' individuals (Weintraub, 1997: 8-10). 
Regarding the second framework of republican-virtue model, the 'public' realm is the 
political community based on citizenship: at the heart of 'pubic' life is a process of active 
participation in collective decision making, carried out within a framework of fundamental 
solidarity and equality (Weintraub, 1997: 10). This whole realm of activity and the 
problematic it generates are not discussed in the liberal-economistic model. 'Public' means 
'political' in both frameworks, but there are different meanings of 'political'. For the 
liberal-economistic model, ‘political’ means the administrative state. For the 
republican-virtue model, 'political' means a world of discussion, deliberation and collective 
decision making (Weintraub, 1997: 10-11). The meanings of the public under the 
republican-virtue model originate from the recovery of the notion of citizenship in Europe in 
the later Middle Ages, which emphasizes participatory self-determination and deliberation 
(Weintraub, 1997: 11-14). 
Weintraub points out (1997:15) that the republican-virtue model has captured an important 
phenomenon that the liberal-economistic model tends to blank out: the 'public' or the politics 
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cannot be reduced to the state while the realm of social life outside the state cannot simply be 
identified as 'private'. This notion of public/private dichotomy is emphasized by Habermas's 
paradoxical formulation that "the bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the 
sphere of private people [who have] come together as a public" outside and even against the 
state to discuss and debate matters of common concern (Habermas, 1089:26). 
Therefore, civil society has the nature of 'private' although it is an open public sphere 
composed of intermediate organizations. This public domain is formed when private 
individuals voluntarily associate together. The private sphere is normatively important to civil 
society because it is seen as the domain from which potential solidarity, equality and public 
participation can arise (Sheller & Urry 2003: 109-111). 
As Garcelon points out (1997: 305), the historical development of the West has contributed to 
this normative belief. With the spread of market relations in Western Europe since the 
century, a distinctive pattern of societal integration coordinated horizontally within the 
regulative framework of civil law began to displace traditional forms of authority. As 
legal-modem capitalism matured, the newly legitimate pursuit of profits by particular interest 
bound by contractual obligations and legal norms supplanted both the economic activity of 
landed gentry and the pursuit of socially illicit gain by profiteers. In this way, the 'private' no 
longer implied solely ‘the particular', but also 'the rational' pursuit of one's interest within a 
system of interdependence. The struggle between absolutist prerogatives and the recognition 
of private economic rights associated with the rise of the market did not only spur attempts to 
conceptualize the new form of social integration as 'the invisible hand', but it also helped 
engender another sense of the private, rooted in 'personal life' and the pursuit of leisure 
activities conducted in a rights-protected sphere of domesticity. The domestic sphere was then 
15 
legally shielded from public scrutiny (Garcelon, 1997: 305-307). 
The private in the West thus connotes much more than the merely 'particular'. In the majority 
of cases, what refers to the ‘private’ assumes a diffuse web of laws and mores. Cohen and 
Arrato call the private sphere “a domain of individual development and moral choice" (1992: 
346). Cohen advocates (1996:199-205) its protection against illegitimate intrusion to allow 
room for individuals searching for their identity. Post (1989:963) calls for “rules of civility" 
safeguarding respect for individual privacy, in a sense constitutive of both individuals and 
community. This is because reciprocal recognition of private sphere is the condition of the 
possibility of successful social interaction based on mutual recognition of the integrity of the 
participants. Neville suggests (1995: 255-292) respect for private sphere means tolerance for 
individual choice, forming the base of a pluralistic society. 
2.3 The private sphere as the cultural foundation of civil society 
The existence of intermediate organizations alone is inefficient to support a sustaining civil 
society. Even if people enjoy autonomy from the state and have freedom to engage in 
associational activities, civil society can be 'uncivil' in a way that people oppress one another 
for their own interests. To be truly 'civil', civil society should be built upon the culture of 
pluralism. A substantial degree of tolerance is also necessary. 
Gellner highlights "the importance of being modular", which means membership of social 
groups must be voluntary and overlapping (1995). This is because when society is 
autonomous from the state, individuals may be still suppressed if they are bound to social ties 
like kinship. In this sense, apart from a flexible social structure which allows mobility of 
individuals, a culture of pluralism which recognizes diversity and difference is also essential 
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(Giner, 1995:305-306). 
When people quest for pluralism without tolerance, a society may degenerate into, in Shils’ 
words, "a war of each against all" (1991:15). Civil society may face the danger of becoming a 
site of intense conflicts between irreconcilable interests and ideas. Shils suggests (1991:12-15) 
that tolerance can help people to hold anger and resentment in check, pacifying and calming 
sentiments. It makes opposition less irreconcilable and limits the intensity of conflict. 
Compromises may be more possibly reached among antagonists. 
These cultural qualities of an ideal civil society reflect that the 'private' occupies an 
important position in civil society. While a pluralistic culture is preferred to allow individuals 
to pursue their lifestyles, tolerance is favored to respect people's choices. The common 
rationale of these civil elements is to allow room for private individuals to define their own 
goals. Tracing the course of the idea from its early modem origins in the thought of John 
Locke to Marx, Seligman points out (1995:15-58) that the central theme of modem civil 
society ideal is to pursue a social order based on the ideas of 'contract' and the autonomous 
individual upon which the contract is rested. It is thought that civil society should be formed 
by rational, self-ruling and autonomous individuals who co-operate voluntarily in managing 
themselves. When allowing cooperation, this social order should concomitantly preserve 
individuation. If civil society overemphasizes collective interest and does not defend the 
value of the individual, it will become oppressive and undemocratic. As Seligman stresses, 
"However, once again, any attempt to return to an ethical solidarity not based on the idea of 
the individual as autonomous moral agent leads nowhere...We need only recall the type of 
ethical nationalism that has been tearing the towns and villages of Yugoslavia (and parts of 
the former Soviet Union) apart" (1995: 197). 
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The protection of the private sphere signifies respect for the individual. Certainly, the private 
sphere itself may not necessarily guarantee civil society. Yet, without it, civil society cannot 
take root at all. "For if constitutive of civil society is some sense of a shared public, so is the 
very existence of the private. It is after all the very existence of a free and equal citizenry—of 
that autonomous, agentic individual一of the private subject that makes civil society possible 
at all...Where there is no private sphere, there is, concomitantly, no public one—both must 
exist for sense to be made of either one" (Seligman, 1998: 29). 
2.4 The boundary between public and private in Mao China 
Analyzing the boundary between 'public' and 'private' in former Soviet societies, Garcelon 
states that (1997:317) the public realm in these societies referred exclusively to the state 
sovereignty and officialdom. On the other hand, communist rulers saw the market as the root 
of all evil and viewed autonomous producers, owners, and traders as potential ‘class enemies'. 
They believed that the general/public interest was to be reconciled with particular/private 
interests simply by denying any recognition of the private as a legitimate element of social 
life. The notions of private interest and the individualistic pursuit of the ‘personal life' were 
disallowed (1997: 310). Following its effort to suppress or even destroy the 'private', the 
party-state systematically suppressed any independent public life. It treated autonomous 
association per se as illegitimate. As a result, the public realm in the sense of republican 
citizenship could not arise from the private sphere (1997:311). 
Garcelon's analyses can be applied to Mao China. Under the rule of Mao, the 'private' was 
seen as illegitimate. Since 1956，‘transition from capitalism to socialism' had been recognized 
as the target of socialist construction, followed by a series of radical economic policies. 
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Millions of peasants were organized into communes and private enterprises were confiscated 
by the state. Public ownership became the only legitimate form of ownership (Ming & Zhang, 
1995: 128-131). 
Personal life was intervened by the state. While the 'private' and individualism were treated 
as the 'poisoning' bourgeoisie cultures, collectivism and the ‘public’ were regarded as virtues 
of proletariat ideal. Under these beliefs, people were not allowed to spend their private time 
freely. In the name of ‘collectivism’，it became an unwritten rule that leisure activities should 
take the form of group action. Those who failed to participate in officially organized leisure 
activities risked being criticized (Wang, 1995: 153-154). The state even regulated the content 
of leisure time by proposing that spare time could not be a political vacuum but filled with 
proletariat ideas. Politicalization of leisure reached the peak during the Cultural Revolution. 
All Chinese people were allowed to watch only eight 'revolutionary model plays' and a few 
dozen carefully selected films (Wang, 1995: 154-156). As work units (danwei) were the only 
source from which urban residents could obtain jobs, housing, pensions and other resources, 
urban residents were bound to work units and enjoyed a modicum of autonomy. They were 
forced to spend most of their time in workplace taking part in production or political study 
groups. People were under close surveillance of their supervisors, who could interfere with 
whom they interacted or scrutinize their political thoughts (Walder, 1986). 
Owing to the state's monopolization of the control and distribution of most resources, people 
did not have any material or social resources to organize autonomous organizations (Xie, 
1993). Moreover, the state destroyed any independent forms of associational life which were 
regarded as rivals of the regime (Sun, 1994: 39). ‘Mass organizations' (qunzhoung zhuzhi) 
like the All-China Federations of Trade Unions, the Women's Federation and the Young 
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Communists League, were created by the state. They had virtually no organizational 
autonomy (White, 1996: 208). Public life was characterized by participatory mobilization. 
The state mobilized people to participate in various mass campaigns (Sun, 1994: 40). 
2.5 Reshaping of the boundary between public and private in post-Mao Era 
The boundary between public and private has reshaped in post-Mao era. Since 1987, the 
reformers have embarked a program of economic reform which has involved a number of 
fundamental changes in the management of the economy. These include a shift from 
command planning to guidance planning, the increasing allocation and distribution of 
resources according to the price mechanism, decentralization of economic power to lower 
levels, the diversification of ownership forms and the opening up of the domestic economy to 
foreign direct investment (Howell, 1998: 57). In the rural areas, decollectivization has led to a 
de facto privatization of land. In order to absorb the surplus rural labor and lower labor input 
requirements on the farm, the government has promoted the development of rural industry. 
Also, the promotion of the private sector has provided employment in the urban areas 
(Howell, 1998: 58). Thus, the 'private' has regained legitimacy as public ownership is no 
longer the only permitted form of ownership 
On the other hand, personal autonomy has been enhanced. Leisure is depoliticalized and no 
political guidelines are laid down for its contents (Wang, 1995: 165-166). Leisure activities 
have become increasingly diverse because political hindrances to the enjoyment of private 
time have declined (Wang, 1995: 158-165). Urban residents are no longer bound to work 
units. They can obtain job opportunities, housing and other resources from the market (Yang, 
2002: 15-16). With the decrease in political study groups, the workplace is depoliticalized 
and large portions of each day previously claimed as the domain of work units have become 
2 0 
private. However, the state still retains substantial powers that limit personal autonomy. It is 
evident in the one-child family policy and in the arrests of religiously heterodox individuals 
that the state has the ability to intervene into the most private areas of personal life. The 
private sphere is not totally free from state intrusion. 
As the state no longer monopolizes the control of both material and social sources, which are 
now able to flow from the hands of the state to individuals, the emergence of a new 
intermediary social sphere becomes possible (Xie, 1993, 7-9). The new forms of social 
organization, distinguished from the traditional 'mass organizations', provide new ways for 
people with common interests to come together. Autonomy of this social sphere is 
constrained. All social groups are required to register with the government and the types of 
social groups eligible for registration are regulated (Howell, 1998: 64). Many social groups 
newly formed in post-Mao era are either controlled by the state or semi-official in nature. 
Diversity of the organizations is limited. While social organizations of a technical scientific, 
professional, trade and cultural nature proliferate, politically motivated organizations or 
advocacy groups are limited in numbers.^ 
2.6 The cultural foundation of civil society of China 
The cultural foundation civil society consists of two political traditions—republicanism and 
liberalism. In republican tradition, the participation of citizens in public affairs is regarded as 
a virtue. In liberalist tradition, civil society connotes the individual rights and liberty. 
This study is mainly based on the political thought of liberalism. As Lui and Chan (2001: 376) 
9 See, for example, Wang (1994). In 1990, about 70% of social groups registered in Xiaoshang of Zhejiang 
Province were semi-official in nature. There were government officials in the committees of these social 
groups. While 62 % of social groups were of economic or scientific nature, only 8% were concerned with 
political issues. 
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asserts, civil society should be based on a culture in which people value their autonomy. They 
suggest, “If a society enjoys freedom from state intervention, but people enjoying private life 
do not perceive such freedom as their right (e.g. to perceive it as a gift granted by the 
rulers)..., civil society has not formulated in this society according to the standard of the 
West" (2001: 376). 
Orientations of people are important because civil society will be effective only when people 
treasure their individuality and perceive their personal autonomy as a right. Otherwise, they 
may not be conscious of defending themselves, and they may not have intention of 
organizing themselves to strive for their interests. As Chandhoke suggests, “The presence of 
civil society is a crucial, but not an adequate precondition for ensuring state accountability. 
Whether the state can be made accountable depends upon the self-consciousness, the 
vibrancy, and the political vision of civil society. An inactive civil society leads to 
unresponsive states; a politically self-conscious civil society imposes limits upon state 
power" (1995: 10). 
To illuminate the cultural foundation of civil society of China, it is meaningful to find out 
how people perceive the private sphere, especially when the state still attempts to intrude into 
private life of people. Whether they consider personal autonomy enjoyed in the private sphere 
as their right or "a gift granted by the rulers" is important to the potential for civil society. 
Only some scattered surveys show orientations towards personal autonomy among people of 
China. For examples, a national poll in 1987 found that 68.3% of respondents agreed with the 
statement that “The government should not intervene into private life of individuals" (Ming, 
1989: 186). A poll of Chinese in the early 1990s indicated that 30.4% of respondents 
associated freedom with the right to choose one's own lifestyle whereas 10.9% associated 
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freedom with the right to choose an occupation and to change jobs (Shi, 1997: 12-16). Yet, 
these surveys may not be able to reflect people's perceptions clearly. Questions of these 
surveys have been decontextualized. They cannot manifest how people think and react when 
their personal autonomy is challenged in daily life 
2.7 Residents' Committees of China 
Aiming at exploring people's perceptions of the private sphere when facing state intrusion, 
this study focuses on how Guangzhou residents interact with Residents' Committees (RCs; 
jumin weiyuanhui), which are base-level government organizations often interfering in 
private life of urban residents. 
RCs are found in urban areas all over China. They are a network of some 119,000 
organizations, each based within a specific urban neighborhood, usually comprising three to 
seven members and led by the RC director]�The law stipulates that each committee covers 
an area including 100 to 700 households, but their jurisdictions can be larger, sometimes 
covering over 1,000 homes. The RCs usually head some subordinate organizations which 
may include residents' small groups, specialized sub-committees, and volunteers (Ma & Lin, 
2000). 
The committees are not regarded as part of the government. They are defined by law as 
“base-level autonomous organizations of the masses". In spite of the legal definition, they 
still constitute an extension of the municipal government's administrative apparatus. Large 
Chinese cities contain three levels of formal administration: the city government {shi zhengfu), 
the district government {qu zhengfu) and the street office {jedao banzhichu). Each street 
10 At the of the end of 1998, there were 119,042 RCs comprising 508,363 members nation-wide, according to 
figures collected by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
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office supervises a number of RCs (Read, 2000: 806). 
Official duties of the RCs include: “（1) to publicize the Constitution, laws, statutes and state 
policies; to uphold the lawful rights of residents; to teach residents to fulfill their lawful 
obligations and protect public property; to carry out many forms of activities in promoting 
socialist spiritual civilization; (2) to manage public affairs and projects of public benefit for 
residents of the neighborhood; (3) to assist the People's Government and its agencies in 
conducting work pertaining to residents' interest in public sanitation, birth control, welfare, 
youth education, and so forth; (6) to express residents' opinions, requests and suggestions to 
the People's Government and its agencies." (Zhong hua remin gongheguo fagui bianji 
weiyuanhui, 1990: 140). 
The major purpose of RCs is to direct the energies of citizens to facilitate government 
administrative and policing tasks, as well as providing a range of everyday services. In doing 
so it mobilizes people to serve as their liaison with the government, communicating official 
policies and announcements to them, selectively responding to and communicating to higher 
levels their special needs or, and collecting a wide range of information about them. It thus 
performs functions in some ways parallel to those of the work unit (Read, 2000: 808). As 
some researchers have documented, the political-administrative nexus of the workplace has 
traditionally been much more important for urban residents employed in state or collective 
units than its neighborhood counterpart (Whyte & Parish, 1984; Lu cfePerry, 1997). This is 
because urban residents typically depend on the workplace for a salary, housing and benefits, 
while government relies heavily on the workplace to administer urban affairs. However, the 
authorities believe that proper management of the cities requires neighborhood-based 
organization to connect with population groups not encompassed by work units (Yang, 2002). 
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Neighborhood-based organization in the People's Republic began immediately after the 
communist takeover with a set of ad hoc committees that attempted to cope with the wartime 
chaos. Residents themselves organized some of these committees based on the model of 
pre-communist neighborhood organizations, while others were established by the early 
military governments. In the years that followed, the government unified and standardized 
these local organizations. In 1954, the RC was formally established (Townsend, 1967: 
158-159). The government saw the committees as a tool for policing as well as a means to 
incorporate and mobilize elements of the populations they could not effectively reach through 
other mass organizations, particularly housewives and the unemployed (Townsend, 1967: 
158). The RCs expended effort on programs such as literacy campaigns, sanitation and 
dispute resolution. Although RCs were never as central to urban administration as were work 
units in Mao-era, observers generally judged them to be powerful instruments of state 
penetration (Schurman，1968; Townsend, 1967; Vogel, 1971). 
Neighborhood work was temporarily disrupted during the early years of the Cultural 
Revolution, when rebellious residents established 'revolutionary' versions of both street 
offices and RCs (Salaff, 1971: 294). Nevertheless, these local organizations held considerable 
power within their area of jurisdiction. They acted as enforcers of the household registration 
system, collaborators with the police and promoters of various political campaigns, as well as 
dispensers of ration coupons, housing and jobs in street-level factories and workshops 
(Schurmann, 1968). Committee activists monitored and even led denunciations of criminals 
and political enemies (Frolic, 1980: 224-241). 
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After economic reforms, rural-to-urban migration and extensive lay-offs from public sector 
enterprises have meant that more and more people living in the cities fall outside the reach of 
work units. As the government is committed to enforcing birth-control policies, maintaining 
household registration and suppressing potential challenges from organizations such as 
falungong, it needs to strengthen neighborhood-based administration (Read, 2000: 809). In 
the 1980s, the central government began an attempt to reform neighborhood organization, 
formally expressed in the Residents' Committee Organization Law passed in December 1989. 
An important impetus behind this move was to rebuild grassroots organization in response to 
the increasing disorder in the cities. Just as in earlier decades, the state sees such organization 
in part as a tool to use in combating crime, regulating country folk who venture into the cities 
and maintaining political stability. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, national and municipal agencies made efforts to reform RCs. 
Officials considered many of the RCs as sclerotic, underfunded and isolated form their 
communities. They sought to turn this around by recruiting new staff, finding new sources of 
revenues and encouraging more participatory style while maintaining the RCs，basic role as 
official mediating bodies between the government and people (Yang, 2000). In post-Mao era, 
it is true that RCs intrude far less into ordinary people's lives than they once did, but they still 
play a powerful role in political, social and economic life of many urban neighborhoods. 
They have acquired new significance in areas like the leasing of public property, the 
provision of many services, and the implementation of policies such as the one-child policy 
(Read, 2000: 807). 
2.6 Methodology 
This study adopts the qualitative methods of observation and interview. Fieldwork research 
was conducted in one community in Guangzhou. There are totally nine informants in this 
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study. Five of them are staff of the RC which oversees that community, while the other four 
are residents living or working in that community. 
In 2003, the Bureau of Civil Affairs of Dongshan District cooperated with the Department of 
Sociology of Zhongshang University in organizing a training program for staff of RCs in 
Dongshan District. The department offered 7 classes, each of which lasted for three weeks. 
Recommended by the department, I succeeded in obtaining official permission to conduct 
research in Dongshan District. 
I at first planned to begin research in March 2003. Unfortunately, I could not carry out the 
plan due to the outbreak of SARS in Guangzhou. The whole study was suspended until 
October 2003. A pilot study was conducted when I attended the second class of the training 
program from 22 October to 1 November 2003. There were 67 participants coming from 
different RCs in Dongshan District. Only two of them were males. By talking to 14 
participants, I leamt more about the routines of RCs and the role of RCs in government 
administration. At the end of the class, 7 participants invited me to visit their workplaces. I 
only accepted one participant's invitation. I chose this participant because she was the 
Director of a RC. I believed she could guarantee me the chance to conduct my research. 
Fieldwork research was conducted between 18 November and 30 December2003. As the 
Director allowed me to work with other staff, I was able to observe the daily operation of the 
RC and how the staff interacted with residents. Including the Director, there were 5 females 
working in that RC. Through daily contacts, I learnt from them about the government policies 
that they were ordered to enforce. Some of the policies involved intrusion into the private 
sphere of residents. 
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During this period, I lived in the community overseen by the RC so that I could observe the 
daily life of residents. One neighbor, two shop owners and one hawker in the community 
became my informants. I tried to find out their opinions about the government policies which 
involved intrusion into their private sphere by conducting semi-structured interviews with 
three residents and by daily contacts with one resident. 
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Chapter 3 Routines of Residents' Committees 
3.1 Dongshan District: pioneer of reforming Residents' Committees in Guangzhou 
Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong Province, is one the most prosperous cities in China. 
Since 1980s，it has witnessed double-digit economic growth. Guangzhou's economic 
development has benefited from the open-door policy and its proximity to Hong Kong. In 
1984, Guangzhou became one of the fourteen coastal cities that the central government 
favored for the development of ties with the international business community. This status 
enabled city authorities to draw independent development plans which intended to encourage 
overseas Chinese and Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau “compatriots，，to invest in Guangzhou. 
In the initial stage of development, most of the joint ventures and foreign-owned businesses 
involved investors from Hong Kong." 
Headed by the municipal government, Guangzhou consists of 10 districts {qu) and two 
counties (xian), covering 7434.4 km^. At the end of 2002, it had a permanent population (i.e. 
people with household registration in Guangzhou) of some 7.2 million. In addition, there was 
a floating population of about 3 million. Supported by strong economic growth, the 
municipal government has been able to input resources in various projects. The New 
Guangzhou Baiyuan International Airport has cost the government renminbi (i.e. currencies 
of China; RMB) 19.8 billion. Furthermore, Guangzhou is going to host the Asian Games in 
2010. The government will invest RMB 1.65 billion to build the Asian Games Village. ^ ^ 
In the late 1980s, the central government decided to reform neighborhood organization. 
Responding to this initiative, reforms of Residents ‘ Committees (jumin weiyuanhur, RCs) of 
Guangzhou have been first carried out in Dongshan District since 1990s. Located at the 
" S e e Ikels (1996: 16-17) 
12 Guangzhou nianjian bianzuan weiyuanhui (2003). 
Ming Pao (2004.7.3) 
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northern back of the Pearl River, Dongshan District is one of the four old city districts of 
G u a n g z h o u . T h e district is sub-divided into 10 administrative units of street, with each led 
by a street office, which in turn supervises 10 to 20 RCs. At the end of 2002, there were 
totally 139 RCs.'^ Since many important political institutions (e.g. The Provincial Party 
Committee, The Provincial People's Congress) are situated in Dongshan District, reforms of 
RCs have been carried out there first in order to provide a good model for other districts. 
In the past, juwei (i.e. the way Guangzhou people call the staff of RCs; the short form of 
‘jumin weiyuanhui') projected a negative image in the minds of Guangzhou residents. Juwei 
used to be old, retired and lowly educated women. Many of them occupied their posts for 
decades. Guangzhou residents thought these old ladies were nosy about people's private 
matters and called them ‘jieba,, which meant 'gossiping in the street’. Image of juwei has 
been improved since 1998, when the district government adopted an open and formal 
procedure to recruit younger and better-educated staff. 
The district government has redrawn geographical boundaries of RCs. Each geographical unit 
under the jurisdiction of a RC is now called ‘community，(shequ). In 2002, residents living in 
communities ranged from 2,520 to 9,079, with an average of 5,129.^^ RC has been re-named 
as ‘Community Residents‘ Committee (shequ jumin weiyuanhui). Title of the staff has been 
changed to ‘community worker {shequ gongzuozhe), with the meaning similar to 'social 
worker'. Yet, Guangzhou residents still call them juwei. Most importantly, election has been 
introduced into RCs to "propel grass-roots democracy，，. 口 Though defined by law as 
“base-level autonomous organizations of the masses", RCs are actually absorbed into the 
14 The other 3 old city areas include Yuexui, Liwan and Haizhu. Please see Ikels (1995) for details. 




government administration. It is hoped that the election can encourage a more participatory 
style under the slogan "self-administration, self-education and self-service". 
3.2 Residents' Committee X 
I began to work at RC-X in one community of Dongshan district in November 2003. Its 
office was about 90 m^, located on the ground floor of a residential building. Three signs 
above the main entrance indicated the office was used for multiple purposes. The one on the 
left was "The Branch of the Communist Party of China in X Community of Y Street of 
Dongshan District of Guangzhou". Only the words on this sign were red—the color 
representing the Party. The one on the right was “Police Post of X Community of Y Street 
Police Station of Dongshan District Division of Guangzhou Security Bureau". The middle 
one was “X Community Residents' Committee of Y Street of Dongshan District of 
Guangzhou." Another 16 smaller signs were hung on the wall: “Public Hygiene Committee of 
X Community", "Working Group on Youth Care of X Community", "Working Group on 
Women and Children Affairs".. .They were the sub-groups of RC-X. 
The office was divided into four areas. One semi-open room was separated for the police post, 
but I seldom saw the policeman in charge on duty. Another semi-open room served as a 
conference room. In the sitting room, there was a shelf with packs of contraceptive pills and 
condoms. The workplace of juwei consisted of 6 desks, a few cupboards and shelves. 
Shortly after I joint the Committee, I realized that the so-called 'democratic election' was 
formalism only. There were eight members in RC-X, including five female juwei and three 
male committee members. They were all elected by residents living in the community in 
2001, with a three-year term of office. The street office had employed juwei before the 
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election. Their employment was supposed to terminate if they could not win the support of 
residents. Yet, the street office manipulated the election process by assigning old and lowly 
educated candidates to compete with the juwei. Moreover，indirect election was held in a way 
that only about 30 buildings ‘ leaders (louzhang) could vote. Buildings' leaders were 
representatives of residents from different residential buildings. Many of them had retired. 
They were elected by residents with the co-ordination of RCs and usually had friendly 
relationship with juwei. Thus, juwei were not accountable to residents although election was 
introduced. They were subordinate to the street office, which controlled their employment. 
The three committee members were mobilized by juwei to stand for the election. Two of them 
were former buildings' leaders. Their roles in RC-X were not essential. As RCs were not 
representative bodies, the committees had no decision-making power to decide any affairs 
related to the community. Unless juwei needed their help when carrying out duties assigned 
by the street office, they seldom appeared at the office of RC-X. There was only one meeting 
at the end of each year which allowed formal participation of the committees. 
I took part in this meeting when I worked at RC-X. To procedurally show that juwei were 
accountable to residents, each juwei orally reported what she had done in the past year to the 
three committee members. The reports were full of language like "under the wise leadership 
of the Party，，，"according to the Party line", and "based on the 'three representative thinking' 
of Mr. Jiang Zemin". The committees looked bored. One had fallen asleep. One kept on 
looking at the floor. The other one simply kept his eyes closed. After all juwei finished the 
presentation, the committee members showed whether they endorsed the reports by ticking 
pieces of paper printed with the names of juwei. Once these procedures were over, the 
committee members took this chance to complain about the bad social order in the 
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community, air pollution caused by a restaurant, and conflicts among some residents. Juwei 
jotted them down and promised they would follow up the complaints. Except expressing their 
opinions, the committee members could do little to participate in the governance of the 
community they lived in. 
3.3 Duties of juwei 
Juwei carried out government policies in four major areas, including family planning, public 
hygiene, social welfare and public order. In each area there was a juwei in charge. Chen, the 
Director of RC-X, was responsible for social welfare. Distributing monthly subsidies to 
residents eligible for social security assistance, informing unemployed residents of job fairs 
organized by the street office and inviting retired residents to join social activities were 
examples of her duties in this area. Chen was also the Secretary of the Party branch. She 
became a juwei in her early twenties and she had worked in different RCs for 18 years. Tao 
was the public order cadre {zhibao ganbu) of RC-X. She executed policies related to social 
order in the community, as well as exchanged information with the police regularly. She 
was 56 years old and became a juwei 4 years later than Chen. A few years ago, the street 
office wanted to lay this primary school graduate off so as to upgrade its workforce. She was 
lucky as some officials agreed to give her a chance. 
Ping, 40 years old, was the birth planning cadre (jihua shengyu ganbu). Her primary task 
was to carry out the one-child policy. Mei, 30 years old, was the public hygiene cadre 
(gongong weisheng ganbu). She regularly checked out stagnant water or breeding sites for 
cockroaches in the community. She and Ping were within the first group of staff recruited 
through formal procedure in 1998. Hua, 30 years old, became a juwei a year ago. She did not 
hold any specific posts in RC-X, but assisted Ping to execute the one-child policy. They were 
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the younger generation of juwei.. 
The work of juwei was not limited to these four specific areas. They also needed to help the 
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government maintain the household registration system (hukou dengji zhidu). Any 
residents who wanted to register their official residence in the community had to apply 
through RC-X. Juwei were unable to monitor all residents as some of them did not change 
registration after moving to other communities while some living in the community did not 
register at RC-X. ShW, juwei could recognize many residents. This was because residents had 
to obtain proof of household registration at RCs before they could marry, apply for birth 
quotas or other official documents. 
People's mediation (remin tiaojie), which meant mediating disputes among residents, was 
another duty of juwei of RC-X. Any residents in conflicts with their family members or 
neighbors could turn to RC-X for help and juwei would act as arbitrators. A few years ago, 
Tao coordinated the maintenance program of a residential building when residents quarreled 
with the charges. A resident once complained to Hua that his neighbor brought him bad luck 
by hanging a mirror outside the door. If a confrontation in the community developed into a 
demonstration of over 30 people against the government, the street office would deduct the 
marks of juwei in annual appraisal for their failure to maintain social stability. Therefore, 
juwei would not hesitate to intervene into any conflicts that might evolve into collective 
actions even if residents did not ask for their help. Juwei had mediated between an employer 
and a group of workers who went on strike for owed salaries before I joined RC-X. 
18 Household registration system, which divides the Chinese population into agricultural population and 
nonagricultural population, was introduced in 1958. Originally, the agricultural population was forbidden to 
work in towns and cities. Physical mobility of non-agricultural population was also limited because they were 
bound to state-supplied grain rations. Since the early 1980s the Chinese government has relaxed the 
household registration system. 
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The street office required juwei to mobilize residents to join the sub-groups of RC-X in order 
to promote participation of residents, but the sub-groups were initiated by juwei and there 
were very few activities. Participants were confined to buildings' leaders and about a hundred 
retired party members living in the community. They constituted what juwei called the 
‘backbone, (gungan) of RC-X. The 'backbone' did not only help juwei meet the requirements 
of the street office by taking part in the sub-groups, but also provided a lot of assistance to 
juwei in carrying out other duties. They might inform other residents of official 
announcements, notice if there were any females with unauthorized pregnancies, or distribute 
various leaflets. 
Director Chen said it had been difficult for her to find new 'backbone' in recent years. She 
owed the problem to increasing anonymity of residents, which did not favor development of 
relationship between juwei and residents. Also, she always blamed younger people for being 
realistic and unwilling to serve the community without material rewards. I could hardly agree 
with the second reason. When residents were not given any power to rule themselves and 
'serving the community' to a large extent meant serving an official body, they certainly 
became uninterested in the channels of participation provided by the RC. 
It was not easy to exhaust the duties of juwei of RC-X. On the one hand, neighborhood work 
had a catch-all quality to it. Residents came to RC-X with any kind of trouble, from septic 
tank overflows to bumed-out streetlights. On the other hand, any branches of the government 
could assign duties to juwei through the street office whenever they needed manpower to 
accomplish tasks in the community. Juwei of RC-X had been involved in inspection of fire 
safety facilities, voter registration of Dongshan District People's Congress, surveys of the 
population... Too much miscellaneous work sometimes made juwei frustrated. They 
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complained that they had done so much work for the government, but they could not enjoy 
the benefits of civil servants as they were not considered as part of the Civil Service. 
I often heard juwei gossiping about the residents. I was surprised that they could precisely 
point out who had been pregnant recently, how long someone had got married or who had 
been infected with hepatitis B disease. In fact, RC-X was often used by the government to 
extend its influence to the private life of residents. For various reasons, the street office 
required juwei to collect their personal information. Besides, it ordered juwei to inspect 
residents' homes and coordinated demolition of authorized building works of residents. Yet, 
juwei sometimes came across difficulties when carrying out these duties. 
3.4 The one-child policy 
RCs are one of the essential institutions enforcing the one-child policy at the grass roots of 
Chinese cities. While they provide education and consultation services on family planning, 
they also work closely with the Police, hospitals and birth planning officials at different levels 
of the government to monitor urban residents. 
In one afternoon, a doctor with a small notebook in her hands came to RC-X to exchange 
information with Hua. In the notebook there were names and addresses of different females. 
The doctor asked Hua to pay attention to a female living in the community. She suspected the 
household registration of that woman was faked. After she left, Hua and I went to that 
woman's home. We found that the house was still being decorated. Hua guessed the woman 
did not fake the household registration, but had not moved to this community before the 
decoration finished. Later, Ping explained to me that hospitals contacted juwei when they had 
suspicions about pregnant women in the community. She praised this process of 'information 
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feedback' {xunxi huikui) for its effectiveness in monitoring female residents. 
On Ping's desk, there were about ten notebooks, each made up of many white cards. I was 
shocked when I read these notebooks at the first time. Each card, titled as ‘Information Card 
of Woman of Childhearing Age' (yuling funii xunxika), recorded in great details the 
reproductive information of a married woman whose household was registered at RC-X. One 
could quickly leam the life of a resident by scanning through her file. When a woman reached 
puberty, when she got married, when she had the first child, why she was allowed to have the 
second child, what contraceptive measure she adopted, when she reached menopause ...were 
all written down on this small card. These notebooks represented a surveillance system 
monitoring more than 800 women of childhearing age in the community. 
From time to time, Ping and Hua visited some target residents, including new couples, 
residents who had just given birth and females who newly registered their households at 
RC-X. They would explain the rules of the one-child policy, distribute free condoms or ask 
about their family planning and contraceptive measures. They sometimes phoned residents to 
double check their information. 
Ping said most residents told her their personal information, but she could feel that people 
were annoyed. Some residents gave perfunctory answers to her questions while some showed 
their impatience with facial expressions. Once the street office instructed her to collect a copy 
of birth certificate of a baby. The baby's mother firmly refused the request. Ping recalled, 
“The mother said, 'It is my privacy!' I was surprised she talked about privacy. She was not 
well educated!" She emphasized very few residents refused to reveal their information and 
she came across this kind of cases only occasionally. 
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However, Ping noticed many residents disliked her presence in their homes. She imitated the 
defensive gesture of a resident who blocked the door with his body. Some residents even 
insulted her. Ping said, “I entered a resident's home. She rudely ordered me to put off my 
shoes. She shouted at me, ‘You make my home dirty!' She was arrogant!" 
Birth planning cadres of other RCs faced similar problems. A year ago, they suggested the 
street office to attract residents with gifts. The street office took this advice and found 
sponsors to provide free daily goods like toothpastes, shampoos and sanitary napkins. Ping 
appreciated this idea very much. She thought people were more willing to receive her when 
she showed the gifts to them. She said, "It is better for me to enter their homes. There may 
not be enough illumination in the doorways. It is inconvenient for me to fill in 
questionnaires." 
Women having used up their birth quotas were required to receive ultrasound test two to three 
times a year. Just before I left Guangzhou, the street office had informed Ping that a resident 
was found pregnant again in the test. Ping asked the resident to come to RC-X and explained 
to her she had to receive abortion. The resident looked scared, with tears in her eyes. She 
asked Ping with a trembling voice, "Will the operation cause pains? I heard some friends 
saying that a new abortion skill can cause fewer pains. Do you know that?" 
Some residents with unauthorized pregnancies might risk violating the policy by hiding in the 
community. Once Ping discovered these residents, she had to follow after them and tried to 
get them captured for coercive abortions. Usually, she took action with the Police and 
government birth planning officials. Thus, Ping had many unusual and breathtaking 
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experiences. She always described how she acted like a detective or how she was in danger 
when residents resisted violently. If they successfully gave birth to children, her annual bonus 
would be deducted. However, it was getting more and more difficult for Ping to discover 
them because they could run away to any other places and hide themselves simply by staying 
indoors. 
I asked Ping if people violating the one-child policy would think reproduction was a human 
right. She defensively replied, “No! No human rights can be negotiated! It is the law of the 
state. Citizens must obey it!" Nonetheless, I could feel that Ping did not whole-heartedly 
agree with the policy. She repeatedly told me two stories. In the first story, a woman 
unluckily caught one week before the expected delivery date was still forced to receive 
abortion. Ping said she could not forget the baby kept on moving under the mother's stomach 
as if it was struggling for survival. In the second story, a young mother who successfully 
escaped from arrest returned to the community after the baby was bom. When she met Ping, 
she nodded at her with a smile. Ping said she was very happy as the mother did not hate her. I 
was sure Ping's bonus was deducted after this case, but she did not seem caring about the 
money. Ping concluded, "The baby is a little life! ... Although enforcing the state policy is 
my job, I only need to try my best to do it." 
Believing in the super-natural power of crystals, Ping wore different crystal necklaces and 
bracelets every day. She also put a big bottle of pink crystals on her desk. A year ago, Ping 
reminded an owner of a crystal shop to take ultrasound test. She warned Ping that residents 
might frequently curse her behind her back and it might bring her bad luck. Since then, Ping 
had become her customer. Ping explained, “If crystals really shield me from residents' curses, 
it will be definitely good. If not, I still can wear them for beauty." I thought Ping felt uneasy 
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about the pressure brought by her position between the government and residents. She needed 
to rely on crystals for psychological comfort. 
3.5 Dengue Fever Prevention 
As a public hygiene cadre, Mei regularly placed rat poisons in drains, mobilized residents to 
eliminate the breeding sites of 'four harms' (i.e. cockroaches, mice, flies and mosquitoes), 
and delivered leaflets about public hygiene to residents. However, her workload would be 
greatly increased if there were epidemics like SARS and dengue fever. 
In 2002, there was a global outbreak of dengue fever. About 1,000 cases of infection were 
reported in Guangzhou between August and September in 2002, equal to 75% of the total 
cases found in the city in that year. To prevent another massive outbreak, the municipal 
government launched a campaign in the summer of the following year. 'Mosquito-killing 
Days' were set to encourage residents to bum mosquito-repelling coils. Consultation stations 
were established to answer residents' enquires about dengue fever. 
RC-X was mobilized in the campaign. Apart from eliminating stagnant water in public areas 
of the community, juwei were ordered by the street office to inspect residents' homes so as to 
check out any plants or utensils for mosquito breeding sites. In July 2003, the five juwei of 
RC-X were divided into three groups and visited residents every evening. The task was 
supposed to be accomplished after they had checked all the 1,845 households in the 
community. 
In RC-X, Mei was the most critical of the government. She loved to share her opinions with 
me. When she attended a training course in social work, she met a critical university 
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professor. Mei sometimes quoted his words to criticize the government. She angrily said, "As 
the professor questioned, 'Why should the government intrude into residents' homes for 
public hygiene?' If residents enjoyed being dirty, what could I do?" 
During the campaign, a slogan had been created and circulated internally in the street office 
to show the officials were determined to prevent dengue fever: "Ensure nobody dies! Ensure 
no government leaders get infected!" Yet, residents did not appreciate juwei inspecting their 
homes. Mei said, “I helped a resident to change water for plants. She warned me with an 
unfriendly tone, ‘Be careful! Please don't break my vase!' Another resident refused my help 
and impatiently said, 'Okay! Okay! I will do it by myself!'，， 
I wondered how they could finish the task when residents felt so annoyed. However, Mei told 
me that they successfully checked 80% of the households in the community. To prove her 
success, she even showed me a thick pile of record sheets. When they checked a resident's 
home and what types of stagnant water were found were clearly written down on them. 
I was doubtful whether the records were genuine, so I asked Ping about them. She told me 
many of the records were fake. Juwei of RC-X made them up in order to cheat the street 
office. Ping said she seldom requested residents to let her enter their homes during the 
campaign. She only stood in the doorways to talk to residents. Even so, many residents still 
looked impatient. They usually said they had got the message and closed the doors quickly. 
To avoid occupying residents' time too much, Ping explained precautionary measure to them 
as quickly as possible. 
"On the one hand, residents didn't want us to inspect their homes. On the other hand, we 
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didn't want to do so much work. Those living in new residential buildings didn't need our 
help. Their homes were usually clean. I did not ask residents to let me check their homes 
unless I came cross the elderly or those whose homes were dirty. These residents might need 
my help." Ping explained. 
Hua even did not dare to request for entering residents' homes. She said, “I felt embarrassed. 
Some residents were having dinner. Some might be afraid that we would make their homes 
dirty. I usually stood in the doorways when I reminded residents to clean up stagnant water. 
At the same time, I scanned their houses with my eyes. If I saw any plants, I jotted them 
down on the record sheets." 
3.6 Clearances of security nets 
In Guangzhou, many residents install metal cages on balconies or outside windows to prevent 
thieves from breaking in. They call these cages security nets (fangduwang). Security nets 
have constituted structural and fire risks endangering the safety of life and property. They 
may collapse due to metal deterioration or obstruct fire escape routes in case of fire. Rusty 
metal cages also adversely affect the appearance of the city. The municipal government has 
announced security nets illegal and existing security nets have to be demolished. Residents 
are allowed to install security bars with exits instead. Paradoxically, before it made this 
decision in 1999, the municipal government had required residents to install security nets 
before they could apply for household registration. Due to bad social order and lack of police 
force, the government hoped that residents could protect themselves with these cages. 
Guangzhou was the host city of the 9th National Games in 2001. Considering the national 
sports as a chance to promote Guangzhou, the municipal government was determined to 
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improve the city's appearance by speeding up demolition of the security nets. Emphasis was 
put on places where the motorcade passed through during opening and closing ceremonies. If 
residents did not remove their security nets, workers of government contractor would clear 
them coercively. Recyclable materials left after demolition were taken away by workers as 
charges. As the community overseen by RC-X was near to a highway leading to Tianhe 
Stadium, the main venue of the 9th National Games, it was also included in the demolition 
program in 2001. 
One day, Mei invited me to check some unauthorized building works with her. When we 
arrived at the courtyard of a residential building, I was surprised to find that almost every 
window was installed with a metal cage. Some of them had deteriorated seriously. I could 
imagine the danger in case of fire. I felt confused that those security nets should have been 
cleared for two years. Why were they still there? 
Mei and other juwei were responsible for coordinating the demolition in the community in 
2001. They delivered official notices to residents, telling them to remove security nets within 
10 days. Later, they led the workers of government contractor to the residents' homes. Mei 
said compulsive clearances caused widespread discontent. She recalled that a lot of residents 
scolded her furiously when she delivered official notices to them. Some buildings' leaders 
went to the office of RC-X to quarrel with her colleagues. Some residents refused to answer 
the door when the workers arrived. The government was forced to make concession and 
delayed removal of security nets which were not facing the main streets. 
Two extreme cases impressed Mei very much. In the first case, an old woman lay in the street 
to stop the car of workers from proceeding to her home. She kept on shouting and crying. 
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Mei and some officials of the street office forcefully guarded her to a hotel and calmed her 
down. Other juwei succeeded in convincing her husband to give in when the woman was 
away. 
In the second case, a woman did not allow the workers to enter her home. The workers 
climbed up to her flat and attempted to remove her security net from outside. She violently 
resisted by fighting the workers with a kitchen knife. She chopped her security net whenever 
the workers touched it. She shouted, “I am not chopping you! I am chopping my security net! 
It is mine!" The workers were forced to leave in the end. 
Juwei were supposed to support the government in this policy, but they were actually 
sympathetic with the residents. Ping said a security net usually cost RMB 2,000 and it was 
not a small amount to general Guangzhou residents. Mei criticized the government had 
changed its policy too suddenly. She added, "They (i.e. security nets) are the property right 
(of residents). The government have infringed on their right!" Hua was not a juwei in 2001, 
but she was also discontented with the government. She said, "The security nets were 
residents' property. How could the government allow the workers to resell them for money? 
If I were a resident, I definitely would not allow them to demolish my security net." 
Mei said residents with close relationship with juwei gave them face. They allowed the 
workers to remove their security nets even though they were unwilling to do so. Other 
residents were very hostile to them. She sighed, “I was like a layer of cream between two 
pieces of biscuits. Conflicts between the government and the residents put me in a difficult 
position." 
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3.7 Leasehold house management 
After economic reforms, relaxation of household registration system has encouraged physical 
mobility of individuals. This concomitantly implies that it has been more difficult for the 
government to exert social control. In Guangzhou, there have been many cases in which 
criminals rented leasehold houses and ran away after they committed crimes. Leasehold 
houses have been used by criminals for producing pirated VCDs, detaining hostages, 
trafficking drugs, etc. Regarding leasehold houses as the seedbed for crimes, the municipal 
government monitor them and requires landlords to register and pay leasehold house 
management fees (chuzuwu guanlifei). 
In RC-X, Tao, the public order cadre, was instructed to monitor leasehold houses in the 
community. She regularly visited the leasehold houses and updated the tenants' information. 
She inquired their names, their ages, where they worked and their household registration. She 
would try to inspect a particular house with the help of the police when she suspected it was 
used for crimes. Some landlords might not register so as to save the leasehold house 
management fees. Tao occasionally checked door to door to see which apartments were 
leasehold houses. Certainly, Tao could do nothing if landlords had asked tenants to hide the 
truth. 
I asked Tao if I could observe how she inspected residents' houses, but Director Chen did not 
allow me to do so. Tao also mentioned little about residents' responses to her inspection. 
She only told me it was generally easy to collect tenants' personal information. People who 
refused to disclose information in the name of privacy were rare. Tao's interpretation of these 
exceptional cases sounded strange to me. She thought those residents were emotionally 
unstable because of health or family problems. In Tao's impression, most Guangzhou 
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residents she had met in the past 14 years were co-operative. She admitted it had been 
slightly more difficult for her to check people's information in recent years, but the problem 
was not serious. She said residents alert to strangers tended to stay behind the doors to ask 
carefully about her identity. Once they confirmed she was juwei, most of them were willing 
to respond to her requests. 
While we were talking about her duties, Tao suddenly said Guangzhou residents had been 
more conscious of their right. She did not further elaborate on her opinions. She only said, 
"People's thinking is more complicated now. They always think about the law." 
In fact, Tao was very alert to me. She did not tell me much about her work in the area of 
public order. I only knew that she monitored leasehold houses, organized voluntary patrols 
and exchanged information with the police. I was sure she also co-operated with the police in 
monitoring falungong believers. Some files named as 'Information on Falungong Believers' 
were locked in a cupboard in the police post at RC-X. I found a list of criteria set by the street 
office which were to assess juwefs performance in maintaining public order. Under the 
category of 'Maintaining Stability', many criteria were related to falungong. For example, 
one criterion was that there should be no collective practice activities of falungong believers 
in the community. Tao and Director Chan became nervous when I requested to copy the list. 
Tao only allowed me to jot down the titles of the eight categories of the criteria. She even 
stood beside me when I was jotting notes. 
Conclusion 
By observing the daily operation of the Residents' Committee, I leamt that the juwei 
frequently interacted with residents. For different reasons, the government officials assigned 
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the juwei to inspect residents' houses, demolish their security, monitor their reproduction or 
collect their personal information. The state influence was able to penetrate into various areas 
of private life of residents through this grass-root organization. 
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Chapter 4 Opinions of Residents 
4.1 Life in the community 
By the end of 2003, about 4,450 residents had registered at RC-X. As many residents did not 
bother to update household registration after moving to the community, the actual number of 
residents living there was greater than official statistics. Internal estimate made by RC-X was 
more than 7,000. 
The community was mainly devoted to residential function, mixed with a few commercial 
buildings, banks and shops. It only took 15 minutes to walk through it. Though small, the 
community had witnessed the changes of Guangzhou in the past two decades. Majority of 
residential buildings in the community were former work-unit (danwei) houses built in the 
early 1980s. Prior to economic reforms, housing in urban China was provided by the state 
through danwei. Residents were not entitled to ownership of the public rental housing. To 
match the shift from central planning to market mechanisms in the allocation of housing 
resources, most danwei houses in the community were sold to residents in 1990s. These 
buildings had less than 10 storeys, all without elevators. On the other hand, a private estate 
with 5 buildings of more than 30 storeys stood out in the community. The estate was 
commodity housing (shangpinfang) constructed a few years ago. Though the appearances of 
these buildings were modem and nice, they did not look harmonious with their surroundings. 
Mixture of buildings of different generations was not only found in this community. It was a 
common phenomenon easily seen in old city districts like Dongshan and Yuexiu in 
Guangzhou. 
I rented an apartment in one former danwei building in the community. The living 
environment was bad. There were few windows in the corridor and illumination was 
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inadequate. It was dark during day time. The paint was flaking off the walls. Metal rails of 
the staircase were rusty. I felt scared when I went to the apartment with my landlord at the 
first time. I was worried that the social order of Guangzhou was bad and it would be 
dangerous for me to return home at night. Later, I found that it was impossible for me to walk 
up the stairs without a torch at night. A supermarket nearby rented the first floor to provide 
accommodation for its staff. The smoke generated by its kitchen went up along the staircase 
every evening, making people almost suffocated. 
Although apartments and public areas of the building had been sold to the residents, the 
residents still relied on their danwei for property management. Unfortunately, their danwei, a 
public-owned enterprise, was in debt. It could only afford minor repairs of the building. Some 
neighbors told me they had never thought about organizing a maintenance project themselves. 
They believed that maintenance of the building was the responsibility of danwei. Moreover, 
they thought other residents would be unwilling to pay the cost due to limited incomes. In 
fact, many former danwei buildings in the community were troubled by the same problem. 
Some buildings' danwei had even bankrupted. 
Compared with these danwei buildings, the private estate in the community was like a 
paradise. At the center of the estate, there was a small park and a swimming pool for children. 
Some sculptures were put beside the pool. The lobby of each building was decorated with a 
shimmering crystal chandelier and a marble floor. The resident club house provided karaok 
rooms, a gymnasium with steam bath, a ball room and other facilities. Security guards were 
employed 24 hours a day to guard against unlawful entrance into the estate. 
People living in the estate belonged to the middle class of Guangzhou. As many families had 
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more than one car, capacity of the car park could not satisfy their needs. At night, there were 
a lot of cars parked on each road in the estate. A few of them were imported from Europe or 
Japan. Once, a friend of Ping invited us to visit her son's new home in the estate. His son was 
the manager of an enterprise. She complained to us that her daughter-in-law had spent too 
much money. Her daughter-in-law employed a professional interior designer to decorate the 
house. To carry out the design, she spent 20 thousand dollars removing a wall in the sitting 
room. Then, she spent another 10 thousand dollars on a luxurious fish tank. 
The estate looked well managed, but residents were discontented with the service of the 
property management company. One retired woman told me that residents parking in public 
areas damaged the peaceful environment. Smoke emitted by the cars caused air pollution. 
Their security alarms were so noisy that she could not sleep well at night. Ironically, the 
company did not try to solve the problem, but earned money by charging the residents for 
parking. Management fees were unreasonably high as the company frequently increased the 
charge rate. The woman said a group of residents wanted to form a home-owners ‘ committee 
(yezhu weiyuanhui) so that they could terminate the contract with the company. Troubled by 
heath problems, she had participated in preparation meeting once only. But she said, “I own 
an apartment here, so I have a share in the public areas. How can the company use my 
property to earn extra money? ... I support organizing a home-owners' committee. It is 
related to my personal interests!" 
It was the only form of public life I could find in the community, but I could not further 
observe it. It was really a great regret. I was unable to contact other residents who took part in 
organizing the home-owners' committee. The woman refused to introduce the initiators to me. 
She said she did not want to help me because she could not obtain any benefits from my 
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research. 
Before I went to Guangzhou, I had been informed by Hong Kong newspapers of many 
robberies, murders and kidnappings in the city. In my impression, social order of Guangzhou 
was bad. During the month I stayed in the community, there were at least three robberies. 
One happened in a building adjacent to my home. Some people surrounding me had 
encountered thefts before. A man riding a motorbike took away Ping's golden bracelet when 
he passed by her. A buildings' leader told me her golden earrings were stolen while she was 
walking in the street. Many Guangzhou residents reminded me to take care of my belongings. 
Although I was alert and careful, my mobile phone was stolen when I was taking a ride on 
the new mass transit railway. Due to limited illumination in the building I lived, I did not dare 
go out at night. Insecurity was the best word to describe my feeling. 
Although a few residents in the community said they seldom dealt with juwei of RC-X, 
interactions between residents and juwei were not uncommon. Unless a resident never 
applied for household registration, marriage certificate, birth quotas or other official 
documents, he/she could not avoid going to RC-X. Even if they did not go there, it was 
possible that juwei would contact them to carry out various government policies. The 
presence of juwei in residents' daily life was manifest. I talked to some residents about the 
government policies carried out by juwei. They were enthusiastic to express their opinions. 
These residents included my neighbors, shop owners and hawkers in the community. 
4.2 Ling 
Ling, 33 years old, was the owner of a crystal shop in the community. When Ping reminded 
her to receive ultrasound test a year ago, she taught Ping about the super-natural power of 
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crystals. Her shop only opened for 3 to 4 hours in each afternoon, but the business seemed to 
be good. Products sold in this shop were quite expensive according to the standard of living 
in Guangzhou. A small piece of crystal about the size of a fingernail cost about RMB 100. 
Still, it attracted a lot of female customers. Many of them lived in the private estate. Every 
evening, the shop was packed with women who enjoyed shopping after work. They were 
interested in the functions of different crystals. Ling always explained to them patiently: 
yellow crystals could increase wealth; pink crystals could bring love; purple crystals could 
restore health... 
Ling lived with her husband and one-year-old daughter in the private estate. Her husband was 
the manager of a sports company. Ping told me Ling owned several other shops in the 
community, but she leased them to other people. 
Ling had an unhappy experience when she was pregnant. She had applied for a birth quota 
shortly after marriage, but she did not want a baby when she was still young. A few years 
later, officials of the street office persuaded her to give the quota to another pregnant woman. 
They promised to grant her a quota again when she wanted a baby in the future. Yet, the 
officials broke the promise when she got pregnant two years ago. She had negotiated with 
them for a long time to get her quota back. 
Having experienced so many difficulties, Ling loved her daughter very much. Although she 
had employed a full-time baby sitter, she sometimes missed her daughter so much that she 
closed the shop earlier than usual and rushed to see her. Ling boldly told me she would like to 
have one more child when she was rich enough to afford financial penalties. She was 
planning to give her daughter a brother or sister so that she would not feel lonely. 
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If Ling was determined to have the second child, she had to hide herself from arrest until the 
last moment of delivery. Even if the baby was bom successfully, she and her husband were 
required to pay social nurturing fees (shehui fuyufei) to the government individually. 
Otherwise, the baby would not be entitled to household registration. Social nurturing fees 
would be equal to two to six times the per capita disposable income of Guangzhou in the 
previous year. If their incomes were higher than the per capita disposable income, the 
government would charge them extra fines equal to one to two times the difference. ^ ^ 
Ling did not think it was wrong to have more children, but she did not consider reproductive 
choice as a basic right either. She suggested that residents could neglect the policy as long as 
they were rich enough to rear the children. She said, "If my circumstances allow me to have 
one more child, I would like to do so. I love children very much. They are lovely! I love my 
girl, as well as other children. I think they are pure and lovely. I think it is nice to have more 
children if you are rich enough. But I don't think it is good for people with low living 
standards (to have more children). They do not have the financial ability (to rear the 
children)." In Ling's impression, many people violated the one-child policy. She attributed 
this trend to people's increasing ability to afford financial penalties 
Juwei of RC-X never asked about her personal information for the one-child policy. However, 
Ling could imagine it would be embarrassing for her to disclose information related to her 
relationship with husband or her contraceptive measure. She said, "Sometimes, juwei visit a 
resident when other family members are also at home. Even if only she and her husband are 
19 Article 55 of the Guangdong Province Population and Birth Planning Law. See (Guangdongsheng zhengfu, 
2002). 
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there，they may feel uneasy when being asked about this kind of information. Chinese people 
are a bit conservative. It will be embarrassing if juwei ask residents this kind of questions... I 
think this is something very, very private! I don't talk about it with my parents. I only talk 
about it with my husband. If they know it, officials of the street office surely will know it, too. 
Will they further leak it to other people? I think it is my privacy (siyin). It is unnecessary for 
other people to know my privacy." 
Although Ling was worried about her privacy, she did not insist on defending it. I asked what 
she would do if juwei visited her. She said she would respond to their inquiries if only she 
was at home. This would make her less embarrassed. She said, “I feel that I will not be 
willing (to respond to juwei). I will not be voluntary to let them know (my information) 
unless I am at home alone. Even if only the baby sitter is there, I will not want to let her 
know." 
Compared with informational privacy, Ling seemed to care much more about spatial privacy. 
Although she lived in her own apartment, she did not support juwei to inspect leasehold 
houses of other residents. She said, "It is residents' privacy. Every family has their secrets. 
For example, my husband takes off the T-shirt and wears a pair of shorts in hot weather. It 
will be inconvenient if they enter my home. I also don't want others to see what I have put in 
my house... They (i.e. juwei) don't have my permission. They are not familiar to me. I don't 
want them to enter my home." 
Ling could only accepted the idea that juwei inquired about tenants' information in the 
doorways. She regarded inspection of leasehold houses as infringement on residents' right. 
She angrily said, "Who are you (i.e. juwei)! What right do you have to check my house? You 
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are infringing on my right to my house. You are infringing on my belongings. I hate it very 
much! ...Both landlords and tenants are unwilling to allow juwei to check their houses. I don't 
break the law. I don't commit crimes. Why should I let them check my house? If they check 
my house, I will feel that it is like the police searching my home. It is unnecessary! I don't 
commit crimes. I don't break the law. I don't need you to check me. You can ask me 
questions in the doorway. I will answer you, but please don't enter my home!" 
Inspection of residents' houses for dengue fever prevention also sounded unacceptable to 
Ling. She thought that residents would take care of their living environment. Interventions of 
juwei were unnecessary. She suggested, “They can tell residents what problems have 
happened and what dangers mosquitoes may bring. I think it is okay when there is enough 
promotion. They need not check stagnant water in every household. Residents should clean 
their homes themselves." 
Ling was concerned with her living space very much. She told me her house was smaller than 
other apartments in the private estate. She still chose it because it was attached to a mini 
garden. She enjoyed staying at home, sharing this 'paradise' with her family. She said, "It is 
not easy to buy a house. When I am able to buy one, I would like to lead a comfortable life in 
it. I don't like to interact with the others. I want to enjoy life with my family in my house. I 
don't want to expose myself to the others. My house is small. It has two bedrooms only, but it 
has a big balcony. I have planted many flowers and trees. The feeling is different. I can have 
this private space in a big city. It is like a paradise! I don't need to go to other places. I return 
home and go to my garden. I feel comfortable and happy." 
Two years ago when Ling lived in another community, her security net was demolished by 
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the government to prepare for the 9th National Games. She understood that security nets 
endangered the public safety, but she thought residents were legitimate to install them. She 
criticized the government was unable to improve the poor social order of Guangzhou. Thus, 
she was sympathetic with those residents who strongly resisted the compulsive clearances of 
security nets. She explained, "At first, the government required residents to install security 
nets. It was unable to deal with the bad social order, so it required people to install them for 
crime prevention. However，it now requires residents to remove them. That's why residents 
have been resistant. Another problem is that social order is really bad. If the government 
could maintain a good social order, I would feel secure. In fact, I don't like security nets. I 
don't want to put myself in a cage. It is dangerous！ It is uncomfortable to live in a cage. I 
would not need a security net if I could sleep well without worries at night. Residents feel 
insecure, so they need security nets." 
Ling also criticized the government had executed the policy too hastily. She believed that 
conflicts between the government and residents would not have been so serious if the 
government had made more efforts to convince residents to accept the policy. She said, 
“Residents have spent so much money on the security nets. They have lived with them for a 
long time. Although they understand that security nets may collapse and cause danger, they 
still feel reluctant to remove them when tragedies have not happened...It is very important to 
change residents' thinking first. I think the government should have done more in this 
aspect." 
4.3 Mr. Peng 
Mr. Peng owned a tea shop in the community. Various types of Chinese tea could be found in 
this small shop. Besides, there were some bottles of colorful herb tea on the shelf: red rose, 
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purple lavender, white jasmine... They made the shop look nice. Recently, herb tea had been 
popular among female white-collar workers of Guangzhou. These bottles showed that Mr. 
Peng was sensitive to the market. However, his business was not good. His shop was located 
inside the private estate, so his customers were confined to residents living there. Moreover, 
there were two other tea shops in the same estate, leading to keen competition. Peng tried to 
attract more customers by offering discounts and souvenirs, but these measures did not work. 
To kill time, he always played computer games in the shop. 
Mr. Peng was 40 years old. He was specialized in finance when he studied at university. He 
had once worked in the field of property management. 
His security net was also removed by the government before the National Games. 
Although compulsive clearances had been carried out for two years, Mr. Peng was still angry 
at the clearing process. He thought the government had enforced the policy too coercively. 
One day, he returned home after work as usual. He was astonished to find that his security net 
had disappeared. Workers of government contractors climbed up to his house to remove it 
when nobody stayed at home. A few days later, Mr. Peng found that the workers climbed up 
to his neighbor's flat. He was furious and shouted at the workers angrily, "How can you do 
that? The residents are not at home. If they lose anything, will you be responsible for that?" 
Inconsistency of the government on policies related to security nets made Mr. Peng 
discontented. He complained, "In the past, it required residents to install security nets before 
they could apply for household registration. Due to the bad social order, it required residents 
to install them. When it wanted to demolish residents' security nets, it said it wanted to 
improve the city's appearance！ ... Why didn't it say security nets affected the city's 
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appearance from the beginning? If the social order has improved, the government may advise 
residents to remove security nets. But it is not the case. The demolition policy is 
compulsive!” 
Mr. Peng agreed that demolition of security nets was good to public safety, but he suspected 
the real intention of the government. He thought fire safety was only an excuse, and what the 
government wanted was to save face. Therefore, Mr. Peng was not convinced. He said, "The 
government wanted to enhance its image during the National Games. It did not want 
tourists and central government officials to think that Guangzhou residents were living in 
pigeon cages. It (i.e. clearing security nets) was only a 'save-face project, (mianzi 
gongcheng)\ ...Once the National Games finished, the government did not demolish 
security nets which were not facing main streets. That's why I call it 'face-project'. If the 
government had been concerned with public safety, it would have removed all security nets. 
Public safety was only of secondary consideration. Its main concern was to save face!" 
Having his own house, Mr. Peng was never troubled by juwefs inspection. He knew that 
residents living in leasehold houses did not want juwei to check their homes. He thought there 
were two possible reasons. Firstly, some landlords wanted to evade paying leasehold house 
management fees to the government. They might request their tenants to ignore juwei ^ 
inspection. Secondly, some residents might want to protect their privacy. He said，"It is 
normal. Juwei want to enter and check residents' homes, but residents think that juwei do not 
have the right to do that. They think it is their privacy, so they refuse to co-operate." 
I asked Mr. Peng how he would respond if he was a tenant approached by juwei. He firmly 
said, "I would answer their questions in the doorway, but I would not let them enter my home. 
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I think it is my privacy." I was confused by his answer. I wondered why he would stop juwei 
from entering his home to protect his privacy while he would be willing to tell them his 
personal information. Mr. Peng did not offer a clear answer to my doubt. He simply said to 
me，"It is very normal! You also would not like the others to enter your home. Would you?" 
To Mr. Peng, the idea that juwei checked out stagnant water in each household in the 
community was ridiculous. He thought it was not efficient to depend on a few juwei for 
elimination of all breeding sites of mosquitoes. To achieve a better result, Mr. Peng suggested 
that the government should organize more education programs to spread the message of 
dengue fever prevention. He also suggested that the government could encourage residents to 
participate in activities like 'Mosquito-killing Days'. 
Moreover, he thought the idea was infeasible. He thought it was impossible for juwei to enter 
residents' homes. Mr. Peng said, “They (i.e. juwei) should not do that. It is too silly! ... The 
possibility of inspecting each house in the community is low. Sometimes, residents are not at 
home. Even if they are at home, they may refuse to let juwei enter their houses. It is tiring for 
juwei to carry out their duties. Also, residents must resent it very much. Juwei want to enter 
residents' homes and check out how many plants they have. Residents must feel annoyed!' 
4.3 Mrs. Tang 
Mrs. Tang was an employee of a newspaper stall in the community. I bought newspaper from 
her before I went to RC-X every morning. She could remember the reading habit of almost 
every customer. Whenever I went to her stall, she automatically delivered to me the 
newspaper I wanted. I was impressed that there was always a pleasant smile on Mrs. Tang's 
face, which made me feel warm and refreshed early in the morning. 
5 9 
Mrs. Tang was 41 years old and her only son was already a teenager. As she had not reached 
menopause, she was still required to receive three ultrasound tests every year. She told me the 
ultrasound test was a bad experience. The process was time-wasting. She usually waited for 
her turn for several hours. Before the test, she had to drink a large quantity of liquid medicine 
so that her pelvic region could be revealed by the machine. Her stomach would be so full that 
she could not avoid suffering from nausea. Besides, Mrs. Tang thought her boss did not like 
her to ask for personal leave to receive tests. 
Juwei contacted Mrs. Tang from time to time to collect her personal information for the 
one-child policy. They were mainly interested in what contraceptive measure she was using. 
Mrs. Tang followed the policy and had used intra-uterine contraceptive device after her son 
was bom. However, juwei still repeatedly checked her contraceptive measure. This made her 
embarrassed and annoyed. She wondered why juwei did not check her personal file but asked 
her the same question every year. She still remembered the first time juwei phoned her. She 
said, "She phoned me and asked if I would mind telling her my contraceptive measure and 
when I got married. I said I didn't know and then hung up. I felt uneasy and embarrassed. She 
asked me over the phone and I could not see her, but I still felt embarrassed.，’ 
Although Mrs. Tang showed the desire for privacy, she did not seem to regard juwei's 
enquiries as a serious problem. She was co-operative whenever juwei asked about her 
personal information. Juwei visited her home once. She said, "They said they were juwei. I 
told them I was using intra-uterine contraceptive device. They asked me if I had ever changed 
it. I said never. I told them when I began using intra-uterine contraceptive device and when I 
got married. I told them everything!" 
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Mrs. Tang agreed that juwei intruded into residents' privacy by collecting their information. 
Yet, her attitude was not strong. She said, "Many residents don't want other people to know 
their private matters. It is their privacy. I think whether a couple wants a baby after marriage 
is their own plan. They can decide themselves what contraceptive measures to use after the 
baby is bom. But if juwei want to ask them (about their family planning and contraceptive 
measures), I think it is not completely unacceptable. ... Juwei can visit a resident to express 
their care after she has given birth to a baby. The resident may not be able to use intra-uterine 
contraceptive device immediately after delivery. Then, juwei should enquire about her 
contraceptive measure later. However, they need not ask her every year. I have used 
intra-uterine contraceptive device, but they still ask me every year. It is disturbing!" 
Like Ling, Mrs. Tang thought residents could have more than one child as long as they could 
afford to rear the children. She believed children with siblings could grow up better, but poor 
residents should not exceed the birth quotas set by the state. She explained, "Rearing children 
more than the state allows cost a lot of money. If residents are not rich enough to rear the 
children by themselves, they will cause economic burdens to society. If they have enough 
money to bring them up and don't need society to share their burdens, they can have more 
than one child... Children can seek advice from their siblings when they come across 
difficulties in their life. Also, their burdens will not be heavy in the future if more siblings 
take care of their parents together. Society has progressed a lot. Having one more child is 
acceptable." 
Compulsive demolition of security nets did not affect Mrs. Tang because she did not install 
security nets at home. She strongly supported the government to prohibit security nets, for the 
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public safety. She thought that many residents installed security nets not to protect themselves 
from thieves, but to increase the space in their homes. She said, "Some residents think their 
homes are small. They use the security nets as balconies so that they can have more storage 
space. Security nets are made of iron. It will be disastrous if they deteriorate and 
collapse.. .Certainly, residents would not install security nets at all if the social order was 
good. But I think many residents' real objective is to increase home space." 
Nevertheless, she thought residents should not be blamed for being resistant to the policy. She 
criticized the government failed to communicate with residents and did not convince them to 
accept the policy. She complained, "There was very little coverage of the policy in both TV 
news programs and newspaper reports. The government should have widely publicized the 
policy.... Before demolition, juwei approached residents to explain the policy for one or two 
times only. That's why there were misunderstandings and fighting (between residents and 
workers of government contactor)." 
Mrs. Tang did not support juwei to inspect residents' homes during the campaign against 
dengue fever. She thought keeping home clean was the responsibility of each resident. Juwei 
could teach residents how to prevent dengue fever by delivering leaflets to them, but 
residents could decide whether they followed the advice. She also suggested that juwei should 
avoid disturbing residents. She said, "Residents must dislike inspection of their houses. Some 
people do not want the others to know what plants they have. Therefore, they do not want the 
juwei to enter their homes. Some juwei may not be able to keep the secrets of the residents." 
4.4 Mr. Song 
Mr. Song was my neighbor. He lived in the apartment just opposite to mine. He went to 
6 2 
Guangzhou from Hangzhou ten years ago. He had already obtained permanent local 
household registration. Mr. Song was a manufacturing engineer. His employer was the 
danwei which formerly owned this building. Despite being a professional, Mr. Song did not 
seem to earn a lot of money. His house was poorly decorated with a few pieces of old 
furniture. The walls were dirty. Mr. Song told me his danwei was in debt. He speculated that 
it was going to be bankrupt, but he dared not find another job. He said he only needed to 
work 7 hours a day at that danwei and he could spend more time taking care of his 
10-year-old son. I never saw Mr. Song's wife. I heard form juwei that it was a single-parent 
family. 
I sometimes visited Mr. Song after dinner. He told me some interesting stories about RCs in 
the past. When planned economy was still practiced, RCs were responsible for distributing 
ration coupons to residents not encompassed by danwei. During the Cultural Revolution, 
there were cases in Hangzhou that juwei searched residents' homes and arrested them at 
midnight. Mr. Song thought the present RCs intruded far less into the private life of residents. 
He had lived in the existing apartment for almost ten years, but juwei never visited him. 
Yet, something made Mr. Song confused. One day, he came cross a buildings' leader in the 
community. The old woman said she was a former juwei. She still remembered Mr. Song and 
his son. Mr. Song was surprised. He told me he had not gone to RC-X for more than seven 
years. He wondered why that former juwei could remember him. 
Mr. Song bought the apartment from his danwei. He thought juwei should not inspect 
residents' leasehold houses, but juwei could collect tenants' information. Mr. Song said he 
would not mind disclosing his information if he were a tenant. He thought other residents 
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would not mind, either. He explained, "There is nothing I can't tell the others...As long as a 
resident can settle the internal affairs of the family and other people do not intrude (into his 
home), he will co-operate and reveal his information." 
Mr. Song said residents were not obliged to respond to juweVs inquiries because juwei had 
little authority. Yet, he thought not many residents would refuse to co-operate. He explained 
that Chinese people preferred harmony to confrontation and they were not alert to protecting 
their privacy. He said, "Compared with Hong Kong people and westerners, people in China 
are less conscious of privacy." 
Conclusion 
After talking to these residents, I found that they were most conscious of their spatial privacy. 
They resented very much juwefs inspection of their houses. I was especially impressed by 
Ling's reaction. She angrily compared juwei's action to the police searching her house. Also, 
I noticed that the residents were critical of the policy of clearing security nets. On the one 
hand, they agreed that the policy was beneficiary to the public. On the other hand, they were 
able to criticize the wrong-doings of the government. For the one-child policy, they tended to 
relate the reproductive right to one's economic situation, rather than to consider it as a basic 
right. Also, they were less conscious of protecting their informational privacy when juwei 
collected their information for the one-child policy and the policy of leasehold house 
management. 
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Chapter 5 Residents' Perceptions of the Private Sphere 
5.1 Four domains of the private sphere 
To explore how Guangzhou residents perceive the private sphere, I have chosen four 
government policies executed by Residents' Committees to provide a platform for the 
residents' viewpoints. These policies involve four domains of the private sphere where 
contests between the state and the individual arise. The four domains of the private sphere 
include: (1) the domestic space; (2) the property; (3) the body; and (4) the personal 
information. Undoubtedly, they do not exhaust all domains of the private sphere, nor do they 
I 
I 
represent all areas of private life intruded by the state. The Residents' Committee I observed 
J 
I was responsible for surveillance of falungong believers. This showed state intrusion into the 
1' 
I: spiritual world of the individual. Yet, I was unable to leam the details because the juwei in 
j 
i-
charge deliberately kept it secret. 
The government policies and the domains of the private sphere involved are indicated in the 
following table: 
Private domains Relevant policies Remarks 
Domestic space Management of leasehold house Juwei inspect the houses of suspected tenants. 
Dengue fever prevention Juwei check out the stagnant water in each 
household 
Property Clearances of security nets Non-standard security nets are to be demolished 
by the government. 
Body The one-child policy Most married females are allowed to have one 
child only. 
Information Management of leasehold house Juwei inquire of tenants their names, their ages, 
where they work, etc. 
The one-child policy Juwei inquire of females their contraceptive 
measures, their family planning, etc. 
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To facilitate the following discussion on residents' perceptions, I would like to briefly review 
some issues related to those domains of the private sphere first. As both the domestic space 
and the personal information involve the problem of privacy, I am going to discuss them in 
the same section. 
The domestic space, the personal information and privacy 
Privacy involves the management of the visible and invisible boundaries between individuals 
(Chan, 2000: 1). Thus, the individual control of personal information and space is regarded as 
a basic means to achieve privacy (Pratt, 1976). As a behavioral concept, privacy involves four 
states, including (1) solitude- the state of being alone and unobserved; (2) intimacy- the 
establishment of intimate relations with others, across various small social units; (3) 
anonymity- the capability to remain unrecognized in public; and (4) reserve- the ability to 
protect personal information and to maintain psychological barriers (Westin, 1970). Westin 
suggests that privacy has four functions. It enables the individual to achieve (1) personal 
autonomy, (2) emotional release, (3) self evaluation, and (4) limited and protected 
communication. 
For Altman (1976), privacy is a question of the permeability of boundaries between oneself 
and others. Individuals contact others selectively, and the individual's perception of privacy 
develops from his or her ability to regulate the flow of information efficiently, without 
interference or intrusion from the outside (Chan, 2000). 
Therefore, privacy can be understood as "a subjective response which varies according to 
individual preferences and various social setting" (Chan, 2000). As the form and function of 
privacy zones are diversified and interpersonal boundaries are often culturally constructed, 
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privacy may be attached to various kinds of objects and relationships in different settings and 
for different purposes (Chan, 2000). Thus, the interpretation of privacy is culturally specific 
(Fahey, 1995), and it may differ significantly within a given juridical structure. 
In the West, privacy is considered as a basic right, which is to safeguard the dignity of the 
individual (Frey, 2000). Potential threats to privacy posed by the government through its 
extensive collection of personal information and actions against citizens from investigative 
agencies often arouse widespread social concern in many western societies (Margulis, 2003; 
Joshi, Ghafoor & Aref: 2002). 
In Chinese tradition, Jin argues (1994), there is no concept of privacy because the Chinese 
define public and private in abstract ethical terms, which are different from the Western 
socio-spatial conception of privacy. Chan (2000) disagrees with Jin and suggests that there 
are desires or behavior similar to privacy in Chinese culture. In Chinese society, members 
within small social groups are differentiated from outsiders, and the relations among 
members of these groups, particularly among family members, are often intimate. It shows 
the Chinese desire for intimacy, which Westin defines in terms of the individual's ability to 
establish relationships with others across social units (Chan, 2000). 
There are few empirical studies about orientation towards privacy among Chinese people. 
Traver (1984) finds that Hong Kong Chinese are concerned with the governmental collection 
of personal information and control of domestic living space. Concerning people's 
perceptions of privacy in the Mainland, a national poll finds that 68.3% of respondents agree 
with the statement that “The government should not intervene in private life of the 
individual" (Ming, 1989: 186). However, their opinions about which domains of private life 
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should not be intervened by the government are unknown. 
The property and the property right 
Demsetz suggests (1967) that the notion of property involves three kinds of rights, including 
(1) the right to control; (2) the right to income flows; and (3) the right to assign ownership to 
the others. In the West, private property was discoursed as the basis of social order in the 
century. With the spread of market relations, a new pattern of societal integration coordinated 
horizontally within the regulative framework of civil law began to displace traditional forms 
of authority. People came to recognize they were able to govern themselves (Weinstraub, 
1997: 13). To justify his social contract theory which suggests the state is formed by the 
consent of people, Locke (1970) postulates a “state of nature" in which "every Man has a 
Property in his own Person". The reason human beings submit to government is to safeguard 
their property. Locke proposes the preservation of property is "the great and chief end" for 
which men come together to form commonwealths. The link between the property and 
independence of the individual enables private property to acquire a significant status in legal 
traditions of England and the United States (Glendon, 1998). 
In Mao China, the right to private property was not recognized in socialist ideology. Since 
1956, 'transition from capitalism to socialism' had been recognized as the target of socialist 
construction. A series of radical economic policies were carried out to eliminate private 
ownership. In rural areas, millions of people were organized into communes. Land and other 
production materials were monopolized by the state (Printz & Steinle，1997). In urban areas, 
private enterprises were at first forced to accept co-management with the state. When planned 
economy was fully practiced, they were even confiscated by the state. Public ownership 
became the only legitimate form of ownership (Min & Zhang, 1995: 128-131). Urban 
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residents could only rely on the state for resources, which were distributed to them through 
work units (Walder, 1999). Property of the individual was not guaranteed as it could be 
confiscated by the state in various political movements.二^ 
In post-Mao era，various reforms have been carried out to establish the market economy. 
These reforms include a shift from command planning to guidance planning, the increasing 
allocation and distribution of resources according to the price mechanism, decentralization of 
economic power to lower levels, the diversification of ownership forms and the opening up of 
the domestic economy to foreign direct investment. In this process, private ownership has 
regained legitimacy. The right to private property is now guaranteed by the Constitution (see 
discussion below). 
The body and reproductive autonomy 
The body is not only a physical being, but also a product of social construction (Huang, 2000: 
7). Though it constitutes a significant domain of the private sphere of the individual, it is 
contested by different social forces (Huang, 2000: 7). The body is "constituted in the 
intersection of an equilateral triangle the points of which are institutions, discourses, and 
corporeality" (Frank, 1991: 49). While corporeality sets physical limits on the body, 
discourses instantiated and modified in institutions work out cognitive mappings of the 
body's possibilities and limitations. These mappings in turn shape the normative parameters 
Property of the individual being confiscated by the state is one of the themes which often appears appear in 
Chinese novels related to Mao era. The one impressing me most is Gu Hua, Furong Zhen (Hong Kong: Tiandi 
tushu youxian gongsi, 1988). The English version of this novel is A small town called Hibiscus, translated by 
Yang, Gladys (Beijing: Panda Books, 1983). In this story, the house of a woman was confiscated by the state 
in "Four Clean Movement，{siqing yuandong ) in 1964. 'Four Clean' refers to 'cleaning polities', 'cleaning 
economy', 'cleaning organization', and 'cleaning thinking'. This political movement was a 'class struggle' 
initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong. 
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of how the body can experience and understand itself (Frank, 1991: 48-49). 
Turner (1996) suggests a functionalist approach to the problem of the body. He argues every 
society system faces ‘the classical Hobbesian problem' of how social order is possible and it 
is often ‘restated as the problem of the government of the body' (1984: 2). He divides the 
discussion on the body into two levels of populations and individual bodies. At the level of 
populations, Turner suggests (1996:2) the tasks of a social system are 'regulation' and 
'reproduction' so as to overcome the challenges brought by changes in population size and 
mobility. At the level of individual bodies, the tasks are 'restraint' and 'representation' (1984: 
90). That means a social system requires individual bodies to develop internal mechanisms to 
suppress and discipline their sexual desires for the needs of the system (Huang, 2000: 14). 
The state is one of the powerful forces which seek to control the body. As Huang points out 
(2000: 41), the rise of nation-states since the late century has greatly influenced how the 
body is constituted in modem time. Building of nation-states often involves 
‘govemmentality,, which means the technique of governing the conduct of individuals. It is 
believed that the strength of a nation-state ultimately depends on physical conditions of 
bodies. Thus, various 'body techniques' like census, military training and public health 
management are used by the state as means to enhance its strength (Huang, 2000: 41). 
The body in contemporary China, had experienced a process of "statization" since the late 
19th century, in which the body was related to the state building (Huang, 2000: 33-42). 
Invaded by imperialism, various programs were carried in the Qing and Republican periods 
to strengthen the country. Bodily quality was asserted as the key to a strong state. Therefore, 
forbidding footbinding of women, practices of martial arts, introduction of western sports to 
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the country and other methods of body training were adopted (Browell, 1995:37-56). 
Discourses on relationship between the bodily quality and the fate of a nation were popular 
among Chinese intellectuals (Huang, 2000:44-55). 
This mentality relating the strength of the state to the body remains in the one-child policy, 
which has been officially codified since 1979 as a set of rules and regulations governing the 
size of families in China. Under this policy, population becomes a 'discursive category' that 
excessive population growth is thought to be a threat to modernization of China and the 
nation's chance of gaining a place in the world (Greenhalgh, 2001). The policy aims at 
coordinating population and economic development, "to bring them into an ideal alignment 
that will speed progress toward the attainment of xiaokang shenghuo (the state of being 
comfortably well-off)" (Anagost, 1995: 30). To reproduce less means to reproduce better 
because more resources can be concentrated on education and nurture of children. Thus, 
bodily quality can be raised to contribute to national strength. (Anagnost, 1995: 23-32). 
Under these narratives, the state legitimately takes reproductive decision out of women's 
hands. 
5.2 Perceptions of the four private domains of residents 
Guangzhou residents did not perceive the domestic space, the property, the body, and the 
personal information in a uniform way. Although all these domains were threatened by state 
intrusion, residents were concerned with the domestic space the most while the personal 
information the least. I figure out four distinctive ways in which the residents perceived 
different domains of the private sphere and they are summarized as follows: 
1. The Domestic space: Inalienable domain of the private sphere 
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The residents tended to perceive the domestic space as the inalienable domain of the private 
sphere. In their perceptions, this domain was uninfringeable. They believed that they had the 
absolute right to close this domain to the state and this right should not be violated under any 
circumstances. Therefore, any reasons given by the state to justify intrusion sounded 
irrelevant to them. State intrusion into this domain was considered as a serious infringement 
of their right. 
When talking about juwei sought to intrude into the residents' home, the residents showed 
strong concern about privacy. Ling and Mrs. Tang were worried that private life of residents 
and interior arrangements of their houses would be exposed to juwei. This indicated they 
desired what Westin (1970) calls the state of solitude一being unobserved by the others. 
Residents firmly said juwei could not enter their houses because it was their 'privacy' (siyin). 
‘Privacy’ here seemed to imply an additional meaning of 'right'. Ling emphasized that juwei 
could not check her house because she did not break the law. In other words, the domestic 
space being free from state intervention should be the basic right enjoyed by citizens. 
As the residents believed it was their right to control the domestic space, they questioned the 
legitimacy of juwei's intrusion into their houses. Ling challenged juwei and said, "What right 
do you have to check my house?" Mr. Peng pointed out that residents were irritated because 
they thought “juwei do not have the right to do that." By questioning the legitimacy of juwei, 
the residents reasserted their right to the domestic space. Moreover, state intrusion was 
regarded as an infringement of the right of residents. Ling even compared juwei checking her 
house to the police searching her home. 
In both policies of dengue fever prevention and leasehold house management, the 
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government appealed to the public interest when it sought to intrude into the domestic space 
of residents in the name of public interest (i.e. the public health and the public order). Yet, 
residents were not convinced. For dengue fever prevention, they suggested that the 
government only need to tell residents to keep their homes clean. Whether residents would 
follow was as at their own discretion. The government believed that any residents who did 
not keep their homes clean would lead to the spread of dengue fever, eroding the public 
health ultimately. The residents simply ignored it. They insisted on their control of the 
domestic space. 
Residents' perceptions of the domestic space can be confirmed indirectly by experiences of 
the juwei. The juwei admitted that they were sometimes blocked in doorways when they tried 
to enter the homes of residents. Some residents expressed their discontent with language or 
facial expressions. During dengue fever prevention campaign, the juwei felt so uneasy that 
they restrained themselves from entering residents' houses. They even faked the working 
records to cheat the street office. In order to conduct interviews with residents for the 
one-child policy, the juwei had to use souvenirs to attract residents to open the doors for 
them. 
2. The property and the body: Negotiable domains of the private sphere 
Under the policies of clearing security nets and the one-child policy, the residents tended to 
perceive the property and the body as the negotiable domains of the private sphere. They did 
not think these domains should be absolutely closed to the state. Whether they would 
voluntarily accept or refuse state intervention depended on how they perceived justifications 
given by the state, and what reasons residents gave to justify their defense against 
intervention. Openness of these domains of private sphere could be subject to negotiation 
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between the state and residents. 
Residents generally accepted the rationale of clearing security nets. They agreed with the 
government that security nets threatened the public safety. In this regard, they thought that 
government clearing security nets of residents was reasonable. However, it did not mean that 
residents did not care about the property. The public interest was not the only criterion with 
which they evaluated legitimacy of the policy. 
While residents agreed that clearances of security nets could eliminate the threats to the 
public safety, they also criticized the government did not fully consider the interests of 
residents when enforcing the policy. They all argued that the government removing the 
security nets before it improved the public order of Guangzhou would deprive residents of the 
means to protect themselves. Moreover, they criticized the government had executed the 
policy too hastily and coercively. Mr. Peng even questioned the consistency of the policy and 
teased the government by naming the policy as ‘save-face project'. 
As Demsetz suggests (1976)，the notion of property includes three kinds of rights, one of 
which is the right to control. The residents required the government to improve its 
performance to win their consent, showing that they were conscious of the right to control the 
property. They strongly believed that it was the responsibility of the government to convince 
residents to accept its policy. When the state failed to do so and took away their property, they 
felt discontented. 
Juwei also said that they faced strong resistance of residents when they carried out the policy 
of clearing security nets. One juwei compared her difficult position in this policy to “a layer 
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of cream between two pieces of biscuits (i.e. government and residents)". Conflicts were not 
settled until juwei reported to the street office, which was forced to compromise by delaying 
demolition in the end. 
Although residents also perceived the body as the negotiable domain of the private sphere, 
they did not seem to believe they had the legitimate right to this domain. Ling and Mrs. Tang 
said residents were justified to have more than one child when they were rich enough to rear 
the children themselves, without causing any burdens to society. This implied that residents 
were not entitled to reproductive autonomy unless they could do something to qualify 
themselves for negotiation with the state. 
Justifications given by Ling and Mrs. Tang were, indeed, responding to the state narrative on 
population—over population growth would hinder economic development of the country 
(Greenhalgh, 2001). Residents argued that they might negotiate for reproductive autonomy 
when they were able to bear the costs of rearing the children and would not cause harm to 
economic development. In spite of this, such logic of defense was modest when compared 
with the residents' arguments against state intervention in the domestic space and property. 
While the residents insisted on their right to the domestic space and property, they did not 
show the same insistence on their control of the body. 
3. The personal information: uncontrollable domain of the private sphere 
Under the one-child policy, the residents perceived the personal information as the 
uncontrollable domain of the private sphere. Though residents showed desires to close the 
domain to state influence, they did not have strong will to control it. The residents did not see 
they had the inalienable right to refuse state intrusion. Nor did they think they could think of 
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any justifications to negotiate with the state for control of this sphere. They tolerated state 
intrusion, but tolerance was accompanied with uneasiness. 
Juwei were responsible for collecting the personal information of female residents for the 
one-child policy. They were interested in residents' age of puberty, contraceptive measures 
and other information related to reproduction. Ling regarded this kind of personal 
information as "something very, very private". She thought she would feel extremely 
embarrassed if her information was disclosed to the others. Mrs. Tang said she was irritated 
by juwei, who repeatedly embarrassed and annoyed her by inquiring about what 
contraceptive measure she adopted. In view of the states of privacy defined by Westin (1970)， 
it was clear that the residents expressed strong desires for reserve一to protect personal 
information and to maintain psychological barriers. 
However, their desires for privacy were not supported by any claims to right. This contrasted 
with their concern with privacy regarding the domestic space, where they believed they had 
inalienable the right to refuse state intrusion. Ling did not challenge the legitimacy of juwei 
or explain what right she had in this issue. In the end, she said juwei visiting her and inquiring 
about her information were acceptable when other family members were not at home. She 
thought she would feel less embarrassed as her information was exposed to fewer people. 
Though Mrs. Tang had a lot of complaints, she seemed unable to articulate any justifications 
to refuse intrusion. Also，she did answer juwefs questions when juwei approached her. She 
did not seem to perceive collection of her information as a serious infringement of her right 
even though she felt annoyed. The residents tended to tolerate state intrusion into 
informational sphere. 
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4. The open realm: The personal information 
Under the policy of leasehold house management, the residents had different interpretations 
of personal information. They tended to perceive it as the open domain of the private sphere 
and they did not consider state intervention in this sphere as a problem. 
Juwei regularly collected information of tenants living in leasehold houses. To confirm the 
identities of tenants, juwei usually asked about their names, their ages and where they worked. 
While juwei s collection of residents ‘ reproductive information led to worries about privacy, 
residents did not care about disclosure of information related to their identities. Both Ling 
and Mr. Peng said they would not mind answering juwefs inquiries if they lived in leasehold 
houses. Mr. Song said he would co-operate with juwei because "there is nothing I [he] can't 
tell the others". As Altman defines (1976) privacy as a question of the permeability of 
boundaries between oneself and others, it could be said that the boundary of informational 
sphere of residents was fully permeable to the state under the policy of leasehold house 
management. Unlike reproduction information, information related to personal identities did 
not arouse concern for reserve, which Westin (197) defines in terms of the ability to establish 
barriers and to protect information. 
In many western societies, it is believed that governmental collection of personal information 
of citizens needs to be regulated in order to safeguard the right to privacy of the individual. 
This issue was not of concern to Guangzhou residents. Though it was claimed that the policy 
of leasehold house management was to prevent crimes, residents were actually put under 
surveillance of the state. However, the residents seemed to be uncritical of the intention of the 
state or how the state would use their information. 
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5.3 The right to private property: a shield against intrusion 
When the domestic space was threatened by state intrusion, the residents showed no fear and 
confidently denied the state access to it. They perceived they had an inviolable right to 
control this domain of the private sphere. Their perceptions were supported by the right to 
private property (siyou caicha quan), which is legally guaranteed by the law of China. 
The diversification of ownership forms has been a major theme of market reform of China. 
Chinese economy, as Walder and Oi point out (1999: 7-10), has gradually evolved from the 
traditional state ownership once characteristic of communism through five different 
processes—the contracting or leasing of public assets, the sale or outright 'privatization' of 
those assets, the illicit transfer of ownership to elites, investment state entities in private 
enterprise, and finally the creation of new family or other private businesses. As a result, 
private ownership is no longer regarded as antisocialist, as it was once stigmatized in Mao era. 
Property right of the individual is legally guaranteed. The General Principles of the Civil Law 
(Wenfa Tongzan) passed in 1986 states that lawful property of citizens is protected by the law. 
To encourage the confidence of investors doing business in China, the Party-state even 
amended the Constitution in March 2004 to strengthen the legal status of the property right. 
The Constitution prior to the amendment stated, "The State protects the ownership of lawful 
incomes, savings, houses and other lawful properties of citizens". Now, the Constitution 
adopts the term “the right to private property”. It states，"The lawful private property of 
citizens is inalienable. The State protects the right to private property and the right of 
inherence of citizens" (Ming Pao: 2004.3.9). 
The residents did not explicitly claim the property right when they criticized juwei 's intrusion 
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into the domestic space of residents. Yet, they did repeatedly emphasize their ownership of 
their houses. Ling said, “You (i.e. juwei) are infringing my right to my house. You are 
infringing my belongings". She also said she was concerned with her living space because it 
was not easy for her “to buy a house’，. Mr. Peng said, "I would not let them enter my 
home... You also would not like others entering your home." The right to private property 
informed residents that they had legitimate and absolute control of their houses. It should be 
noted that private home ownership did not exist in China before economic reforms because 
housing stock was treated as noncommercial welfare, distributed by city or enterprise 
bureaucrats to city residents. Since the mid-1980s, various housing reforms have been carried 
out to establish the housing market and to encourage private home ownership.^^ 
When residents said it was their privacy and juwei could not intrude into their domestic space, 
their claims to spatial privacy were, in fact, supported by the right to private property. A 
commentary article of The People's Daily (Renmin ribao) is illustrative of the residents' 
perceptions. The title of the article is “Homes of citizens cannot be offended’ (Gongmin 
zhuzhai burong qinfan ) . The author wrote, "Private living space of citizens, especially the 
right to home (zhuzhaiquan), is protected by the law. This is because home is the carrier of 
the private life. It is the safest, the most secret and the most independent private world of 
citizens. It is also the symbol of the privacy right，the property right, other rights and 
freedom of citizens" (Renmin ribao. 2003.7.30). 
The right to private property, which is guaranteed by the law of China, enabled the residents 
to perceive there was a legal boundary between the public authority of the state and the 
domestic space of their private sphere. As the state itself also claims to protect the right to 
21 For details of hosing reforms of China, please see Ho and Kwong, (2002). 
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private property, residents believed even more strongly that they were legitimate to resist 
state intrusion. As Scott suggests, ruling classes often make promises to subordinate classes 
to justify its rule. When they fail to keep their promises, they ironically permit themselves to 
be criticized in their own terms (1985: 335-340). This does not mean that only the ideology 
of ruling classes can affect the consciousness of subordinate class. As Scott explains, "...the 
ideology formulated by the ruling class to justify its own rule provided much of the symbolic 
raw material from which the most damning critique could be derived and sustained (1985: 
339). 
Although security nets were also the private properties of residents, residents permitted the 
government to demolish them for the public interest (i.e. public safety). However, it should 
be noted that the government also sought to intrude into the domestic space of residents in the 
name of public interest (i.e. public health and public order).Thus, public interest might not be 
the only reason why residents gave in under the policy of clearing security nets. Another 
possible reason was that security nets were declared illegal by the government. As unlawful 
property was not entitled to legal protection, the boundary between the public authority of the 
state and this domain of the private sphere became blurred. Yet, this did not mean 
controversies were completely absent. Residents critically evaluated the intention and 
performance of government when enforcing the policy, showing that they still had a strong 
sense of control of the property. If the government had not raised any legal justifications and 
had enforced the policy merely to "save-face", as suggested by Mr. Peng, it could be 
speculated that residents would have resisted even more strongly against demolition in order 
to defend their legitimate right. 
When the state sought to interfere with the body, the residents were unable to perceive they 
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had the right to this domain of the private sphere. As the one-child policy is a national policy 
regulating every citizen and the narrative linking population growth with economic 
development of the country is compelling, there is not much room left for residents to 
negotiate with the state for reproductive autonomy. When no legal barriers can shield them 
from influence of the state, residents can only adopt a modest approach to contend for control 
of the body. 
The residents were not able to deny the state access to their personal information possibly 
because the right to privacy is not yet clearly defined by the law of China (Renmin Ribao. 
2003.2.11). Article 120 of The General Principles of the Civil Law guarantees citizens the 
right to fame (mingyuquan), which means the dignity of the individual is legally protected. 
Privacy has been interpreted by the court as the right to fame in many civil cases (Renmin 
Ribao. 2001.3.28), but it does not possess an independent legal status (Renmin Ribao.2003. 1. 
3). The bill of Civil Law Code is going to clarify the right to privacy of the individual, but the 
bill is still being examined by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and 
it will not be enacted until 2007 (Ming Pao. 2003. 3. 2 )• 
In sum, the residents were most resistant to the state intrusion into private domains related to 
the property right. Interpreting the intrusion into spatial privacy as violation of home 
ownership, they firmly denied juwefs access to their domestic space. When the government 
demolished security nets, they assessed critically its intentions and performance in enforcing 
the policy. They demanded the government to win their consent before taking their property 
away. The residents were less resistant to the deprivation of body autonomy under the 
one-child policy. They thought that people could have more than one child only when they 
could afford the cost of rearing children. Besides, they were submissive to the state intrusion 
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into informational privacy. They tolerated the collection of residents' information by juwei 
for the one-child policy and the policy of leasehold house management. 
82 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 Implications for cultural foundation of civil society of China 
To illuminate the cultural foundation of civil society of China, this study attempts to explore 
Guangzhou residents' perceptions of the private sphere. Through observing a state apparatus 
of Residents' Committee in Guangzhou, four domains of the private sphere where struggle 
between the state and the individual arises are identified. They include the domestic space, 
the property, the body and the personal information. It is found that the residents were most 
resistant to the state intrusion into private domains related to the property right. The residents, 
equating intrusion into spatial privacy with violation of home ownership, strongly refused 
access of the staff of Resident Committee to their domestic space. During the government's 
demolition of residents' security nets in the name of public interest, they protested that the 
government should obtain their consent before depriving them of their property. On the other 
hand, when compared with their reactions to the intrusion into the domestic space, the 
residents were less resistant to deprivation of the body autonomy under the one-child policy. 
Besides, they were submissive to the state intrusion into informational privacy. They tolerated 
collection of residents' information by the staff of Residents' Committee. 
The sole existence of an autonomous social sphere outside the state cannot ensure an active 
and vibrant civil society. If people are unconscious of their rights, they may not have the 
intention of organizing themselves and defending their interests. Therefore, it is essential to 
foster a culture in which people value the individual rights and liberty. In this study, cultural 
foundation of civil society is found in Guangzhou residents' perceptions of private domains 
related to the property right. As the residents believed their control of the property was 
legitimate, a clear boundary between the property-related domains of the private sphere and 
the public authority of the state was drawn in the minds of residents. When the state 
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overstepped this boundary, the residents contended with it for their rights without hesitation. 
This shows that they had a strong sense of personal autonomy in some areas of private life. 
Residents' consciousness concerning those private domains may provide a foundation for 
people to organize themselves and defend their rights against the state in the future. 
In fact, the rule of law is important to civil society. The law can lay out the boundaries of 
state actions so that the state cannot intervene in civil society at will. Thus, an autonomous 
and self-governing social sphere can be ensured. This study demonstrates that the right to 
private property guaranteed by the law may have provided residents a discourse to resist the 
state. Although the state tries to suppress the growth of civil society by requiring 
self-organizing intermediate associations to register with the government, its guarantee of the 
right to private property ironically contributes to the cultural foundation of civil society. 
Showing its determination to protect private property, the state has revised the Constitution to 
stipulate the right to private property clearly. Yet, promise on the property right may have 
encouraged people to contend with the state for their right. In Mao-era, the state could intrude 
into the private life of people whenever it wanted. But now, some legal buffers have been set 
up between the state and the individual. 
The emphasis on individuality in civil society is derived from the political tradition of 
liberalism. However, communitarian theorists in the West have strongly criticized the trend 
towards 'hyperindividualism' in recent year, which means people tend to uphold that the self 
is not bound by any constraints or obligations. They argue that civil society has been 
impoverished when people unlimitedly assert their private interest (Elberly, 2000:10-11). The 
individual and the private are given negative meanings in communitarian debates. As Sheller 
and Urry observe, "One of the key dilemmas of the 20出 century concerned the overwhelming 
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power of the state and market to interfere in and to overpower 'private life'. By contrast, in 
the 21 St century, the emerging social problem is seen as the erosion of the 'public' by 
processes otherwise understood to be 'private' “ (2003: 107). 
It is true that there is unavoidable tension between the ‘public’ and 'private' in civil society. If 
individuals over-emphasize their private interests or retreat into their private life, the public 
domain of civil society will degenerate. Thus, in addition to liberal!st tradition of political 
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thought, cultural foundation of civil society also requires republican tradition, which 
advocates collaboration for public good. More accurately speaking, a balance between 
collaboration and individuation is important to an ideal civil society. 
This study only focuses on one aspect of cultural foundation of civil society. However, the 
findings are still meaningful. It can be seen that the Guangzhou residents in this study were 
able to contend with the state for their rights as autonomous and self-conscious individuals. 
This is definitely positive to civil society of China. When the authoritarian state does not 
show enough respect for the individual; the personal autonomy is not fully guaranteed; the 
private sphere is still threatened by state intrusion, it is important for people to reclaim their 
rights from the state. 
Perceptions of residents concerning the property right seem to reflect that market economy in 
China has contributed to civil society by awakening the self-consciousness of people. The 
phenomenon is similar to the early stage of development of civil society in the West. The 
spread of market economy in the West between the and centuries was one of the 
social forces giving rise to the idea of the individual as the core of social and political order. 
The struggle for economic rights associated with the emergence of the market made people 
awake to their personal autonomy. And philosophically, economic rights became the basis of 
other individual rights. John Locke (1970), for example, justifies that people have the right to 
engage in a contractual relationship with the government by postulating a "state of nature" in 
which ‘‘every Man has a Property in his own Person". Adam Smith (1976) regards the market 
as an ethical arena which offers the individual the freedom to nurture his individuality 
through exchanging property with others. The sense of personal autonomy emerging from 
property ownership was gradually generalized to other private domains of personal life. 
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However, it would be misleading to conclude that market economy in China would 
necessarily lead to civil society in the same way as the West. It is worth noting that 
self-consciousness of the Guangzhou residents in this study was limited. The residents were 
not conscious of defending their reproductive autonomy and informational privacy. They 
were unable to articulate their rights in private domains which were not guaranteed by the 
state. Their sense of personal autonomy needs to develop further for a stronger cultural 
foundation of civil society. In the post-socialist society, the Party-State has withdrawn much 
of its influence from the economic sphere. Still, it retains substantial power to limit personal 
autonomy. The influence of the market in awakening the self-consciousness of people in 
China must be evaluated cautiously, and the unique socio-political context of the country 
should not be overlooked. 
6.2 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research 
This study is an initial attempt to explore the cultural foundation of civil society of China. 
Though it has found out the cultural foundation of civil society in perceptions of the private 
sphere of Guangzhou residents, how those perceptions affect the actual development of civil 
society has not been addressed yet. The gap has to be filled in for a clearer picture. In recent 
years, there have been a lot of collective actions concerning defense of the property in China. 
Their relationship with people's perceptions of the property right is worth exploring. 
During the accelerating process of urban development in China, confrontation between the 
state and people over the problem of forcible resettlement has become intensified. The 
National Bureau of Letters and Visitors Reception {guojia xinfangju), a state organ 
specialized in handling complaints, received 5,360 visitors who expressed grievance against 
forcible resettlement of their local governments in the first eight months of 2003. This kind of 
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visitors increased by 47% when compared with the previous year (Ming Pao. 2003.9.16). 
Individual victims have aroused public concern by committing suicide (Ming Pao. 
2003.11.12). Nonetheless, some have organized themselves to struggle for their rights with 
the state. 
For example, in April 2004，about a hundred famous artists sued the Guangzhou government 
through the Guangdong provincial Higher People's Court (Ming Pao. 2004.4.22). They 
asserted the government should not force them to move out from Art Village in Penyu 
District. One year ago, the government announced that it would reclaim the land of Art 
Village and other residential settlements for the development of the University City. 
Residents of Art Village accused the government of illegal resettlement because their houses 
were lawful property protected by the Constitution. 
On the other hand, home-owners' committees (yezhu weiyuanhui), a new type of autonomous 
organizations in China, have developed quickly in recent years. With the emergence of 
private home ownership after housing reforms, the state allows private home owners to 
organize home-owners' committees to handle problems like property management. Not only 
do the committees defend the owners' interest, but they also provide people with chances to 
leam how to rule themselves. 
On 10 November 2003, around three hundred owners of Fengzeohu Villas blocked up one 
major road in Shenzhen for two hours, leading to serious traffic jams (Nanfang Dushi 
Bao.2004.6.11). They were discontented that the Shenzhen government decided to construct a 
highway passing by Fengzehu Villas without consulting the owners. Realizing their actions 
had caused disturbance to the public, they apologized through an announcement in a local 
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newspaper. They stated they "should not violate the interests of other individuals and the 
public when defending their own rights". They also held a public seminar to discuss how 
citizens could defend their rights through rational means. To ensure the movement would be 
organized and rational in the future, the owners decided to form a home-owners' committee. 
After negotiating with the government for more than half a year, they won preliminary 
success. The government prepared four other proposals for the design of the highway and 
invited the public to comment on them. 
Guangzhou residents in this study were most defensive when the state sought to interfere in 
those domains related to the property right. On the other hand, the examples mentioned above 
illustrate that people in China begin to organize themselves to contend with the state for their 
rights concerning the property. It is meaningful to explore if perceptions of the property of 
Guangzhou residents found in this study are widely shared in the country and if people's 
perceptions contribute to the rise of those collective actions against the state. 
How the law affects people's perceptions of the individual rights in China is another issue 
worth further study. This study suggests that the right to private property guaranteed by the 
law has enabled Guangzhou resident to assert their rights. In fact, in April 2004, only one 
month after the Constitution was amended, about a hundred Beijing residents affected by an 
urban redevelopment project refused to leave their houses (Ming Pao. 2004.4.6). They were 
displeased that the government did not provide enough compensation for their losses. They 
held the Constitution and confronted with the police. One resident used a ball pen to highlight 
the Article 13 of the Constitution: "Lawful property of citizens is inalienable". In the end, the 
government suspended the project and renegotiated with residents for the terms of 
resettlement. 
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After amendment, the Constitution of China also explicitly stipulates that the state protects 
human rights. The Civil Law Code, which is expected to be enacted in 2007, will clearly 
define the right to privacy. Will these legal changes strengthen the sense of personal 
autonomy of people? Will they provide more languages for people to assert their rights? 
These questions are definitely worth further investigation and discussion to cast new light on 
the research of the development of civil society in China. 
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